Environmental scarcity and state capacity  : the conflict of the Niger Delta by Løvlie, Hanne Ekroll
Environmental Scarcity and State 
Capacity  
The Conflict of the Niger Delta 
Hanne Ekroll Løvlie 
 
Master Thesis Spring 2006 Institute of Political Science 






The theme of this thesis was chosen from my curiosity around what it takes for a con-
flict to erupt. It is sometimes hard to believe that the world is not more violent than it 
already is. Exploring the library of the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa, I 
came across a book with alternative theories of international politics, and I started a 
theoretical investigation very much in line with my own ideas.  
Looking in the news I found my case. 2005 marked the 10th anniversary of the 
execution of environmental rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. 2006 turned out to be the 
year that oil prices reached an all time high as the violence continued in the Niger 
Delta. Starting in August 2005 and coming to and end in May 2006, the writing proc-
ess has been both interesting in following the situation and challenging in navigating 
through the information. In this final result I have limited myself to 30 123 words.  
I would first of all like to thank my supervisor Karin Dokken (Autumn 2005- 
Spring 2006) for all her help and guidance, and for railing me in when it was needed. 
I also want to thank Jørgen Løvlie and Yngvild Prydz for taking time to proof-read 
and giving me input.  
To everyone else who has contributed positively to the writing process, I extend 
my deepest appreciations. The university experience would not have been the same 
without the company and support of my friends. Special thanks to Andrew for asking 
the right questions and keeping my eye on Africa, Caroline for housing me and al-
ways being interested, and Kirsti and Olav Løvlie for all their support.   
 
Oslo, May 2006 




Table of content  
PREFACE .....................................................................................................................................3 
TABLE OF CONTENT................................................................................................................5 
1 BACKGROUND ...................................................................................................................7 
1.1 INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................7 
1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..........................................................................................8 
1.2.1 The Possible Cause of Conflict..............................................................................8 
1.2.2 Governing the Scarcities .......................................................................................9 
1.2.3 Democracy: State and Governance in an African Context .................................11 
1.3 EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND ...........................................................................................12 
1.3.1 Nigeria.................................................................................................................12 
1.3.2 The Conflict of the Niger Delta ...........................................................................13 
1.4 FORMULATION OF RESEARCH QUESTION .....................................................................14 
1.5 METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................15 
2. THEORY ........................................................................................................................18 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................18 
2.2 THE EMERGING OF THE THEORIES OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY .............................18 
2.2.1 The Abandonment of Traditional Theory of International Security ....................19 
2.2.2 Critics of the Theory of Environmental Security .................................................20 
2.3 THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AND CONFLICT ............................................21 
2.3.1 Environmental Scarcities ....................................................................................22 
2.3.2 Social Effects .......................................................................................................25 
2.3.3 Conflict ................................................................................................................27 
2.3.4 Adaptation ...........................................................................................................29 
2.3.5 The Vulnerability of Developing Countries.........................................................30 
2.4 DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT .........................................31 
2.4.1 State Capacity .....................................................................................................32 
2.4.2 Public Policy/Redistribution ...............................................................................34 
2.4.3 State Exploitation Hypotesis ...............................................................................35 
2.4.4 African Democracy..............................................................................................36 
2.5 AFRICAN ADAPTATION ................................................................................................36 
2.6 SUMMARY AND MODEL ...............................................................................................38 
3. EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND ....................................................................................40 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................40 
3.2 NIGERIA.......................................................................................................................40 
3.2.1 Nigerian Government ..........................................................................................41 




3.4 ENVIRONMENTAL AND POPULATION PRESSURES .........................................................45 
3.4.1 Supply Induced Scarcity ......................................................................................46 
3.4.2 Demand Induced Scarcity ...................................................................................48 
 6 
3.4.3 Structural Scarcity.............................................................................................. 48 
3.4.4 Grievance ........................................................................................................... 49 
3.5 THE CONFLICT IN THE NIGER DELTA .......................................................................... 50 
4. ANALYSIS..................................................................................................................... 53 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 53 
4.2 SCARCITY IN THE NIGER DELTA.................................................................................. 54 
4.2.1.1 Supply Induced Scarcity................................................................................. 55 
4.2.1.2 Demand Induced Scarcity.............................................................................. 56 
4.2.1.3 Structural Scarcity ......................................................................................... 57 
4.2.2 Social Effects ...................................................................................................... 58 
4.2.3 Environmental Conflict in the Niger Delta......................................................... 61 
4.2.4 Adaptation .......................................................................................................... 64 
4.2.5 The Vulnerability of the Niger Delta .................................................................. 65 
4.3 DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT ....................................... 66 
4.3.0 State Capacity........................................................................................................... 67 
4.3.2 Public Policy/Redistribution..................................................................................... 72 
4.3.3 State Explointation Hypothesis................................................................................. 74 
4.3.4 Nigerian Democracy................................................................................................. 77 
4.3.5 Nigerian Adaptation ................................................................................................. 78 
4.4 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS................................................................................................ 79 
5. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................. 81 
5.1 THE AIM OF THE THESIS.............................................................................................. 81 
5.2 MAIN FINDINGS ON CONFLICT ARISING FROM GRIEVANCE OVER SCARCITIES............ 81 
5.2.1 Theoretical Implications..................................................................................... 82 
5.3 MAIN FINDINGS ON THE EFFECTS OF A NEW DEMOCRATIC REGIME ........................... 82 
5.3.1 Theoretical Implications..................................................................................... 83 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................................... 86 
 
 7
1 Background  
"We are tired of living by the river bank and washing our hands with saliva." 
[Marshall Harry] 
1.1 Introduction 
Little is known about exactly how and why conflicts arise. It is complex, ambiguous 
and different in every case, and people taking up arms often have more then one rea-
son behind it. One possible pathway to rebellion and civil strife identified by re-
searchers is how people potentially rebel over the loss of livelihood and the worsen-
ing of their everyday conditions. When the natural environment which people live off 
is tarnished, they will naturally feel a sense of deprivation. In these circumstances, 
it’s not hard to imagine that places where the living condition are far from satisfying 
for the population would be more vulnerable to a change for the worse. If we look at 
the African continent, it is facing several challenges in this regard that most of the 
West has been spared. There is not only the enormous poverty and the bloodsheds of 
multiple civil wars and the troublesome transitions to democracy, but the resources of 
the land and the livelihood of people and are disappearing at an alarming rate. Deser-
tification, deforestation and the water supplies problem is part of the ever present land 
degradation and is only fuelled further by the rapidly increasing population. Are these 
conditions that, in the worst case scenario, could be a factor in triggering a conflict? 
The form and effectiveness of the institutions of governance is also one character-
istic that separates Africa from the western world, and could be a factor that deter-
mines the vulnerability and adaptability of a society that is faced with environmental 
stress. In countries where the authorities are not as prepared to handle the extreme 
consequences that the degradation process entails, the scarcity of resources might 
worsen the political situation further. One possibility is that people start blaming the 
authorities for their grievances, the institution in charge of redistribution. To govern 
things and resources and men in their relationship to them when there are no re-
sources might in a sense be hard, but what then if the regime in place doesn’t respond 
to the challenges it’s faced with in a positive way?  
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One conflict that appears to have elements of environmental degradation as a 
cause is the fighting that takes place in the oil rich Niger Delta in Nigeria. Since the 
1990’s, the region has degenerated into a dangerous theatre of violent conflict, sus-
tained by ethnic militias, tribal warlords, misguided youths and ethnic groups have 
battled each other over local governance and the control of natural resources  accord-
ing to Samuel A. Igbatayo (2004/2005). Nigeria is the most populous country in Af-
rica and is predicted to double its population in the next 20 to 30 years (Homer-Dixon 
1999:55). The major effect on the environment in the Niger Delta however, is the oil 
production. Several of the different groups live in conditions described as an envi-
ronmental nightmare (Watts 2004:287). 
Knowing the complexity of investigating any conflict, I wish to look at the rela-
tionship between environmental degradation and violent uprising from the people 
affected. To get a broader understanding of the conflict in the Niger Delta, I want to 
investigate what effect an African democracy has on this type of situation.  
1.2  Theoretical Framework 
1.2.1 The Possible Cause of Conflict 
There is a myriad of theories covering the paths to conflict. There is also a significant 
amount of literature covering the relationship between environmental degradation and 
violent conflict, even though the school of thought is relatively new. A well-known 
researcher on the subject is Thomas Homer-Dixon who has developed a theory en-
compassing a causal link between the degradation of renewable resources and domes-
tic armed conflict, which will be my main point of departure. Large-scale human in-
duced problems have long term effects and are often irreversible, and Homer-Dixon 
outlines four social effects as a result, decreased agricultural production, economic 
decline, population displacement and the disruption of legitimized and authoritative 
institutions and social relation (1991:90-98). In this theoretical perspective, environ-
mental scarcity acts mainly by generating these intermediate social effects, and these 
effects are often interpreted as a conflict’s immediate causes.  
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The factors that make the basis for this line of thinking can be witnessed all over 
the world today, but especially in the less developed states. Over 90 percent of the 
expected population growth will take place in developing countries, in which the ma-
jority of the population is often dependent on local renewable resources like crop-
land, forests and fresh water supplies (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998:1). And this is 
why researchers predict that environmental scarcity will have a larger impact on vio-
lent conflict in the third world. An increase in the population of an area and the scar-
city of resources, both have an effect on the demand for the resource that is scarce. In 
other words, an increase in the number of people means that each gets a smaller share 
of the resources. Put in a third world context, both scenarios have devastating conse-
quences, and working together even more so. Resources that are vital for survival are 
disappearing, and there is not enough to go around. A sense of deprivation will be 
translated into grievances if individuals or social groups come to blame or resent oth-
ers for their predicament and it is these grievances that may be directed against the 
state or other social groups (Kahl 1998:87).  
The prediction is that environmental change could in time cause a slow deepening 
of poverty in poor countries, which might open bitter divisions between classes and 
ethnic groups, corrode democratic institutions and spawn revolutions and insurgen-
cies (Homer-Dixon 1998:343). The resources that remain are often controlled by 
powerful interest groups and elites, leaving even less for the majority of the popula-
tion (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998:1). Also worth considering in this regard is the 
predictions of another scholar on the subject, Michael T. Klare (2002) argues that the 
wars of this century will be fought not over ideology, but over dwindling supplies of 
precious natural commodities.  
1.2.2 Governing the Scarcities  
I will adopt the underlying assumption that the connection between scarcities and 
conflict is not a simple one, because environmental scarcity does not inevitably or 
deterministically lead to social disruption and violent conflict (Homer-Dixon and 
Blitt 1998:7). The way that this works, is that scarcities interact with other factors in a 
society, and together they might trigger conflicts. But naturally there are places where 
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civil strife erupts where there is no environmental degradation and there are conflicts 
where degradation is not a factor in the eruption. Is there a possibility that there are 
conditions in a country that either slows down or escalates the pathway from degrada-
tion to conflict?   
Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen (1998) have pointed to some methodological 
weaknesses in the theories of researchers indicating that growing scarcities of renew-
able resources can contribute to conflict. The obscurity factor of the paths of causality 
is highlighted and they find that the variables that “best” explains conflict are the 
country not being a democracy and the level of economic development. But even if 
the regime type and the economic development have a higher explanatory power than 
environmental scarcity, they still find significantly more conflict where there is envi-
ronmental degradation and high population density.   
From the administrative point of view, environmental decline sharply raises fi-
nancial and political demands on government by requiring huge spending on new 
infrastructure (Klare 1998:73). Hauge and Ellingsen also find that there is a positive 
link between democracy and environmental preservation (1998:304). Ted Gurr’s gen-
eral thesis is that just as there are ultimate ecological constraints on economic growth, 
political constraints weigh heavily on what might be achieved collectively in the face 
of serious scarcity (1985:53), and in addition to group conflict as a consequence of 
scarcity, he lists the viability of the democratic state (ibid:54).  
Colin H. Kahl (1998) calls the factors producing scarcities in an area demo-
graphic and environmental stress, and as Homer-Dixon he also points to how the ef-
fect of this can lead to conflict. Kahl claims however, that the mere existence of 
demographic and environmental stress is not enough to spark violent clashes. He puts 
forward a variation of the theory linking grievances and conflict which he calls State 
Exploitation Hypothesis. He upholds that the two major hypotheses that link popula-
tion growth and environmental degradation to civil strife are incomplete. He claims 
that the deprivation hypothesis where social upheaval fuelled by hunger poverty and 
unemployment significantly over-predicts incidents of civil strife, and the state weak-
ness hypothesis where increasing societal demands from scarcities cause conflict un-
der-theorises the state (1998:81-83). The major point of his state exploitation hy-
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pothesis is that states need not totally collapse for population growth and environ-
mental pressures to produce internal violent conflict. Elites in a country can possibly 
try and manipulate the effects of the scarcities to their advantage.  
1.2.3 
                                             
Democracy: State and Governance in an African Context 
The democratization of Africa has been a slow process. It seems like the adaptation 
of a western form of multi-party system in Africa has become the ultimate goal in the 
international community, and not as a mean to fight the fundamental problems of the 
African state such as corruption and the growing exclusion of social groups from the 
benefits that the state still represents (Bøås and Dokken 2002:62). Jean-Francois Me-
dard identifies the African state as neo-patrimonial, a kind of contradictory and vari-
able combination of patrimonial and legal-rational dominations1 (1996:78). The neo-
patrimonial state has a formal bureaucratic structure, but its functioning on personal 
connections. Put in another way, the bureaucracy works on personal power and there 
is no distinction between an office and the man who works there and the administra-
tor is favouring his “own” people.  
What seems clear is that the African democratic state can not be looked at the 
same way as the western state. There is a problem of transferring the theoretical out-
looks from one reality to another. The African state does not fit the traditional ideal 
westphalian model of the state where the sovereignty of the state is a central princi-
ple (Bøås and Dokken 2002:36). When the African state is described as ‘failed’, 
‘weak’ or ‘quasi’, it is the result of it being compared to the western state. The Afri-
can experience is unique and requires its own way of thinking. For example, Patrick 
Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz (1999) claim that the state in Africa was never prop-
erly institutionalized because it was never significantly emancipated from the society, 
and African societies are essentially plural, fragmented and organized along vertical 
lines. It is my view that both how the state is viewed and the thoughts on how the 
bureaucracy works are important factors of the African state and the functioning of 
African democracy that I will consider in the given context. 
 
1 Max Weber identifies three types of domination: Legal-rational, charismatic and traditional.  
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1.3 Empirical Background 
1.3.1 Nigeria 
Nigeria gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and after years of differ-
ent military regimes it made the transition to civilian rule in 1999. Today it has a fed-
eral system, it consists of 36 states and it is the largest and most populous country on 
the African continent. The country is a natural choice of case because it has both se-
vere environmental stress brought on by oil production and there are also numerous 
reports on different incidents of violence in the Niger Delta, which is the place most 
affected by the degradation of natural resources. It is a country with a grim history of 
violence and secessionism, divided by ethnicity and religious beliefs which brings 
additional challenges to the new democracy.   
Like many other third world nations, Nigeria also struggles with widespread cor-
ruption and the rights to land is a volatile issue. The social function of a regime of 
property rights is to minimize conflicts by identifying claimants, and to regulate ac-
cess to natural resources through an institutional and/or legal structure. In Nigeria it is 
called the Land use act (Kolawole 2002:110). In Nigeria, the control of government 
often represents virtually unaudited control over resources (HRW 2003:2). When it 
comes to redistribution, the laws of the Nigerian federation direct the income from 
production back to the states. The 1999 constitution provides that at least 13 percent 
of the revenue derived from natural resources should be paid to the state where it was 
produced (ibid).  
Clement Ikpatt predicts that the most potentially devastating effect of the conflict 
in the Niger Delta is to the democratic concepts of federalism (NDC). It is through 
this system that the resources are redistributed and it is a volatile and much debated 
issue in the country. The borders of the different states have been changed and re-
vised several times. The argument in favour of a federal division of the country is that 
it is a divided nation linguistically, culturally, ethnically and religiously so the way of 
rule should mirror this complexity. On the other hand, in reality Nigeria is governed 
in a centralized manner and the federal structure serves no real function, and several 
observers has labelled it as ‘quasi-federalism’ (see for example Igho Natufe).  
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1.3.2 The Conflict of the Niger Delta 
The Niger Delta, a lush of mangrove swamps, rainforests and swampland is the site 
of rich oil and natural gas reserves in Nigeria. Oil accounts for about 98 percent of 
Nigerian exports and about 83 percent of government revenue (Countryreports.org, 
Nigeria). Besides bringing wealth to the country, it is not easy to contest that the oil 
extraction in the delta region has a negative impact also by causing severe environ-
mental degradation. The main environmental challenges result from oil spills, natural 
gas flaring and deforestation (EIA 2003). Particularly threatened is the mangrove for-
est of Nigeria, the largest in Africa and 60 percent of which is located in the Niger 
Delta. Also facing extinction are the fresh water swamp forests of the Delta, which at 
11700 square kilometres are the most extensive in West and Central Africa. The local 
people depend on this ecosystem for sustenance (Onduku 2001). 
During the military rule, several environmental activists were captured and 
hanged. One of them was Ken Saro-Wiwa who spoke up on behalf of his own ethnic 
group, the Ogoni people. He was criticising the government for the environmental 
damage being inflicted on the land inhabited by the Ogonis. He also challenged Shell 
for its environmental despoliation and human rights violations (Watts 2004:279). The 
conditions that triggered the protest are all around the people that inhabit this area. 
The soil has lost its fertility and the waters its fecundity, destroying the basis for 
farming and fishing (Bassey 2001). A group of researchers travelling the area discov-
ered through personal interviews that most of the people in the areas were experienc-
ing several phobic disorders, by reason of the persistent feeling of threat of starvation 
and negligence from oil companies and their collaborators (Akpofure et al.).  
One way that the locals in the region protest, is that they try to sabotage the oil 
production. Shell claims that about 80 percent of all oil spills from their facilities 
caused by sabotage (ERA 2005:14) Naturally, this is something the oil companies 
and the government taking in the profit wish to stop. There are also secessionist 
movements in the region that wants to make the Delta an independent nation. This is 
an intricate conflict played out by several different actors on several different arenas. 
Human rights watch points to one aspect of the conflict taking place in the delta re-
gion, whereas the strife is labelled an ethnic conflict over the “ownership” of the 
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town of Warri. The rebels want new wards and local government with better ethnic 
representation (HRW 2003). 
The Nigerian government, both at state and federal level, has failed to intervene 
in ways that fully address the multi-laired dimensions of the problems in the delta 
state, focusing only on security force interventions and pro forma meetings with elite 
groups that lead to no concrete outcomes. There is a tendency for politicians to lay 
the entire blame for the violence on criminals carrying out illegal oil bunkering, 
without acknowledging that many of those running illegal bunkering operations are 
allegedly within government (HRW 2003:26). 
1.4 Formulation of Research Question  
The theme of the thesis is conflict and conflict generating factors and the governing 
of resources. The underlying assumption is that there is a strong relationship among 
population growth, poverty, environmental degradation, social violence, political in-
stability and authoritarian forms of government (Pirages 1998:371), and from the 
theories on the relationship between scarcities and conflict and  I have derived the 
model below. The democratic regime as a contextual variable is based on Hauge and 
Ellingsen’s empirical results, where they find the most explanatory power as causes 
of conflict in the variables: regime type, low economic development and income ine-
quality (1998), and the statement that much of the literature on environmental conflict 
ignores political variables (Gleditsch 1998).  
  
Model of the possible causal links: 
Grievance Caused by 
Scarcities 
    
      Æ    Violent Conflict 





To test the model of causal links, I have chosen Nigeria as my case and the analysis 
will be conducted over the fighting in the Delta region. There are many sources of 
conflict in the Niger Delta as elsewhere, and taking in the large perspective, the fight-
ing in the Niger Delta looks like it’s a fight over the “ultimate” resource and income 
generating product, namely oil and the wealth following it. In my research the oil 
production will play a part in causal linkages by being one of the causes behind the 
land degradation and as a huge generator of income. I will focus on the consequences 
of the oil production on nature as cause for the conflict in light of theories of envi-
ronmental security.  
Based on the theoretical background, the analysis will be conducted over the 
question of what degree did conflict arise from environmental scarcities in the case of 
the Niger Delta and what is the effect of the contextual factors. I will try to obtain a 
broader perspective of the situation and to see if the effect of degradation of liveli-
hood can be made smaller. The specific questions I wish to ask, is: 
 What effect does an African democracy have on conflict arising from environ-
mental degradation? More specifically, I want to investigate if the existence of a de-
mocratic regime in Nigeria has any positive effect on the conflict in the Niger Delta 
arising from the scarcities of resources in the region.  
It might seem pointless to look at what can be labelled a contextual variables ef-
fect on what is already determined to be a complex and obscure connection, but I still 
think it can be fruitful to investigate. The absence of conflict, the preservation of the 
environment and a functioning state and administrative system are essentially good 
and virtually incontestable outcomes, and therefore knowledge in this field is needed. 
By including the contextual variable of an African democracy, I aim to get a wider 
understanding of an area of conflict theory that has already been tested and investi-
gated extensively by other researchers. 
1.5 Methodological Framework  
The analysis will start of with an eclectic use of theories concerning the connection 
between scarcities and violent conflict and the effect of regime-type on this link. 
Then the model of causality will be used to investigate the conflict in the Niger delta 
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and the Nigerian form of democracy’s effect on the part of the conflict possibly re-
sulting from the grievances that the environmental degradation is producing in order 
to see how this newly turned civilian rule is governing the resources. The problem 
formulation of my thesis opens for a case study of the Niger Delta conflict and how 
the Nigerian government plays a part. For this investigation it would make the most 
sense to use qualitative methodology. Given the theoretical background I won’t con-
duct an explorative case study but rather use research that would either confirm or 
reject the theoretical model that is being put forward, to the degree that this is doable 
using this kind of qualitative approach. Sven S. Andersen categorizes four different 
types of case-studies (1997:61), and this thesis will fit the theory interpreting type of 
study.  
With any kind of research it is important to have a high level of validity and reli-
ability. In doing research one move both on the theoretical field and the empirical 
field, and the relationship between the two determines the validity of the results. How 
well an operational definition compares with the corresponding theoretical definition 
is one of the most important questions to ask in scientific research (Hellevik 2002:51-
53). In a case study that is interpreting theory it is a problem if the terms used are too 
general so the empirical variation doesn’t become clear (Andersen 1997:70). This is 
something I will try to avoid in order to keep a high level of validity. For my study 
the model of causal paths need to be as close to the theoretical outline as possible in 
order to increase its validity. Reliability has to do with the consistency and accuracy 
of the data in the research. Getting the reliability as high as possible is reliant on a 
clear and precise operational definition (Hellevik 2002:52). In my analysis, my op-
erational definitions like ‘environmental scarcity’ follow the outline of my sources of 
theory.    
The sources that I will be using will be both primary and secondary in the form of 
official rapports, other scientific research, newspapers and statements. The method of 
getting a lot and the most accurate information out of secondary sources is to triangu-
late and to get as many sources that say the same as possible. Also, the problem of 
lower credibility with secondary sources will be dealt with by assessing the credibil-
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ity of the source and making the distinction between statistics and personal state-
ments.   
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2. Theory  
2.1 Introduction  
My thesis is to a large degree driven by theory and theory makes the starting point of 
the analysis. Given the complex situation in the Niger Delta, the use of traditional 
theories of security does not seem to have any major relevance. This is a conflict that 
has been labelled as a resource conflict and a conflict over territory, and there are also 
disputes over political representation. The frustration is directed in different direc-
tions with many different interests and actors. The state is not the main actor and I 
will try to show that this conflict is both intrastate and in the developing world, con-
sistent with the changing nature of warfare.  
The purpose of this chapter of theoretical perspectives on the different connec-
tions between environmental degradation and violent conflict, and also between an 
African democracy and this specific path to conflict, is to build up the argumentation 
to be able to use the model of causal links. The underlying principles behind the 
model will be thoroughly laid out and explained, in order for the model to be used in 
the empirical testing of the situation in the Niger Delta. I will theorise the concepts 
used, and discuss the causal paths. With the starting point in the model of causal links 
I will first line up the causal links between environmental scarcity and violence, 
mostly as presented by Thomas Homer-Dixon and his associates. Then I will intro-
duce the concept of African democracy as an intermediate variable in the causal links 
towards conflict outlined in the first part of this chapter. Critical voices of the causes 
and effects will also be looked into. 
2.2 The Emerging of the Theories of Environmental 
Security 
Paul F. Diehl writes that the diminution of some traditional security issues at the end 
of the Cold War and the emergence of environmental concerns on the international 
agenda have merged to create a topic of scholarly study called ‘environmental secu-
rity’ (1998: 275). In the 1980s, before and as the cold war was ending, there was a 
shift in the way that conflicts were viewed. The focus on the ideological standoff be-
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tween the superpowers was abandoned as it was no longer relevant. This happened at 
a time when researchers became increasingly aware of the challenges ahead in the 
wake of widespread pollution and population growth, and terms like ‘sustainable de-
velopment’ was introduced2. In a way it became obvious that the level of economic 
growth that the world was at could not be kept forever without the environment that 
our resources were drawn from would suffer and the livelihood of future generations 
would be destroyed. But also there were also security warnings raised. Nils Petter 
Gleditsch writes that since the emergence of environmental issues on the international 
political agenda in the early 1970s, there has been an increasing concern that envi-
ronmental disruption is likely to increase the number of disputes from competition 
over scarce resources (1998:382). 
2.2.1 
                                             
The Abandonment of Traditional Theory of International 
Security 
Another point to make is the changing nature of warfare in the post World War Two 
era. Kahl observes that the vast majority of wars have been located in the developing 
world and most of the wars have been intrastate in nature during this time (1998:80-
81). In this alternative theory of security, the violence experienced can be labelled 
environmental conflict. And when theory of environmental security is compared to 
traditional theories of international security, there are a lot of obvious differences. I 
will start off my theoretical outline with the same assumption as Seyom Brown in the 
book World Security (1998), that realism does not have sufficient explanation power 
in the changing dimensions of security and that it is not satisfactory as an analytical 
tool. Also Homer-Dixon states that the modern realist perspective that is often used to 
understand security problems is largely inadequate for identifying and explaining the 
links between environmental change and conflict (1991:84). In the realist school of 
thought, the state is the main actor and the focal point of the research and the states 
are rational maximizers of power in a system that is anarchic. In this view, what the 
decision-makers choose to do is mainly a function of the structure of power relations 
in this system. It sees the world as countries and not as eco-systems. Realism thus 
 
2  Gro Harlem Bruntland (1987) 
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encourages scholars to deemphasize transboundary environmental problems, be-
cause such problems cannot be linked to a particular country, and do not have any 
easily conceptualized impact on the structure of economic and military power rela-
tions between states (ibid.) 
Another dimension worth considering is that like the changing nature of interna-
tional security, African conditions have been labelled unsuitable for the realist ap-
proach. As mentioned, the central object of analysis in the realist school of though is 
the nation state. Dokken and Bøås uphold that it is impossible to look at the state in 
Africa as a unitary and rational actor. There is a wide spectrum of governmental and 
non-governmental actors with different interests on the arena (2002:37). It is difficult 
to determine whose national interest is behind the different actions. The state in Af-
rica can not be seen in the same light as the classic ideal westphalian state. Chabal 
and Daloz talks about this different state in Africa (1999) and argue that the state 
there was never properly institutionalized because it was never properly emancipated 
from society because of historical factors and cultural considerations.  
The narrowly focused “realist” lens fails to illuminate many of the momentous 
developments occurring within, above, and across the jurisdiction of the nation states 
that are creating dangerous incongruities in world politics and security (Brown 
1998:1). In a way, realism has been determined not suitable for African conditions by 
scholars, much so on the same grounds as for environmental security, since in both 
analyzing conflict in an African context and from an environmental point of view, the 
inadequacy of realism is visible through its focus on nation-states in an anarchic 
world. 
2.2.2 Critics of the Theory of Environmental Security  
The study of environmental security is still largely an emerging field, without the 
strong theoretical and empirical bases on which to cumulate and integrate knowledge. 
On the research done in this field, the most comprehensive and empirically tested 
studies are done by a team of researchers led by Thomas Homer-Dixon at the Peace 
and conflicts Studies Program at the University of Toronto. They refer to themselves 
as the Toronto group. They have however been criticized from different scholars, 
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some arguing that this should not have the same relevance for the thinking of interna-
tional security as more traditional military views should have. Marc A. Levy accuses 
the line of thinking for being too abstract and that the role scarcities play in causing 
conflicts is too obscure and of little importance (1995).  Daniel Deudney (1990) ar-
gues that the environment and human conflict have little in common. He believes that 
using nationalism as a way to raise environmental awareness can ultimately hurt 
global efforts to stop environmental damage.  However, both of these views must be 
said to be angled from a U.S. national security perspective with the likelihood of con-
flict erupting in the first world being the main concern.  
Gleditsch (1998) points to a number of methodological problems in the scholar-
ship on the relationship between resources, the environment and armed conflict the 
way that it is done by Homer-Dixon and his associates. The problem of bringing na-
ture into social theory is that political, economic and cultural variables are ignored, he 
argues. These are then rebutted by the Toronto group when they point to that the so-
cieties that are most vulnerable to environmentally induced violence are those simul-
taneously experiencing severe environmental scarcity and various forms of institu-
tional failure (Schwartz et al 2000:81), and by saying that they only claim that the 
effect on conflict is indirect (ibid:82). 
2.3 Theory of Environmental Security and Conflict 
Despite the critics, a lot has been done to investigate the links between the degrada-
tion of people’s habitat and the probability of conflict, both quantitative and through 
different case studies. The extensive work and different projects of Homer-Dixon and 
the Toronto group will be the basis of the theoretical outline of the links between en-
vironmental change and conflict3. Looking at the model of causal links I presented in 
the previous chapter, the first part of this theoretical outline corresponds to the arrow 
between grievances caused by scarcities and violent conflict. There are more complex 
links and more steps in the causal-path analysis of the links between environmental 
                                              
3 The Key findings of The Project on Environment, Population and Security and of the Project on Environmental 
Scarcities, State Capacity, and Civil Violence are some of the findings of this group research.  
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change and conflict than indicated in my simplified model that needs to be illumi-
nated to understand the background. I will be presenting the causes of environmental 
degradation and the social effects of scarcities and how the social effects can lead to 
conflict.  
The first key finding of the Toronto group’s Project on Environment, Population 
and Security is that under certain circumstances, scarcities of renewable resources 
such as cropland, fresh water, and forests produce civil violence and instability. 
However, the role of this “environmental scarcity” is often obscure. Environmental 
scarcity acts mainly by generating intermediate social effects, such as poverty and 
migrations, that analysts often interpret as conflict’s immediate causes (1994-96). In 
other words, they claim to have found and proven the link between environmental 
degradation of different sorts, and conflict. In this postulation, there are two causal 
steps in explaining how conflict can arise from scarcities of renewable resources. 
Firstly, what causes the scarcities, and second, what effects the scarcities have on 
people.  
2.3.1 Environmental Scarcities  
Clarification of this somewhat indistinct concept starts of with Homer-Dixon’s defini-
tion that environmental scarcity is scarcity of renewable resources, such as cropland, 
forests, river water and fish stocks (1999:8). Renewable resources are natural re-
sources, such as freshwater, clean air, cropland, forests, and fisheries, that theoreti-
cally regenerate themselves indefinitely through normal ecological processes. Kahl 
writes that renewable resource scarcity emerges when the stock or flow of a resource 
is quantitatively depleted or qualitatively degraded at a rate faster than the rate of re-
generation (1998:85).  
When looking the cause and effects of environmental scarcity, it makes sense to 
start with the creation, namely what causes this scarcity of renewable resources – the 
different forms of environmental change. Scarcity has three main factions of causes, 
depletion and degradation of the environment, population growth and unequal distri-
bution of the resource. The different forms of scarcity can be illustrated by using a 
simple “pie” metaphor, where the pie is the renewable resource. The reduction in the 
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quantity or quality of a resource shrinks the pie, population growth and increased 
demand for these resources boosts demand for the pie and unequal distribution can 
cause some groups to get portions of the pie that are too small to sustain their wellbe-
ing. Homer-Dixon distinguishes between three different types of scarcities that lead 
to grievances among the population and then again possibly to war. But it is difficult 
to map out the exact cause and effect of each type of scarcity because they are seldom 
straightforward and clear-cut, but rather part of a complex system of links with simul-
taneous, vague and multidirectional effects - It is after all nature. 
2.3.1.1  Supply Induced Scarcity of Resources 
Supply-induced scarcity is caused by the degradation and depletion of an environ-
mental resource, for example the erosion of cropland (Percival & Homer-Dixon 
1998:280), or in a way the impacts of human activity on the earth’s renewable re-
sources. Without being a biologist or an expert on pollution, one can detect changes 
in the natural environment with the naked eye. In some way or another, the broad 
term ‘environmental problem’ can be observed throughout the world in the form of 
pollution and human imprint on the surroundings. For example, one can se the effects 
of the changes in the form of smog infested cities, cut down forests and contaminated 
water. Homer-Dixon identifies seven major environmental problems, greenhouse 
warming, stratospheric ozone depletion, acid deposition, deforestation, degradation of 
agricultural land, overuse and pollution of water supplies and depletion of fish stocks 
(1991:88-89). These are often inter-correlated and may appear simultaneously. It’s 
hard to contest in this day and age that this observable degradation is not human-
induced, and in some cases it’s safe to say from what we know that the changes in the 
environment are large-scale and in some cases irreversible. One prediction is that of 
the major environmental challenges facing humankind, degradation and depletion of 
agricultural land, forests, water, and fish will contribute more to social turmoil in 
coming decades than will climate change or ozone depletion (Homer-Dixon 1991:7), 
and these changes in turn are the ones that directly affect the renewable resources. In 
a World Bank report ranking the environmental problems in the Niger Delta, the ag-
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ricultural land degradation, fisheries depletion, deforestation and loss of biodiversity 
get high priority (1995:viii). 
2.3.1.2 Demand Induced Scarcity 
Demand induced scarcity results from population growth within a region or in-
creased per capita consumption of a resource, either of which heightens the demand 
of the resource (Percival & Homer-Dixon 1998:280). In a society where there is a 
shortage of resources, an increase of the population involves an increase in the num-
ber of people competing for the resources and can be a cause of further distress of 
living conditions. Population size and growth are key variables producing the syn-
drome of environmental scarcity. While sometimes population growth does not dam-
age the environment, often this growth - in combination with prevailing social struc-
tures, technologies and consumption patterns - makes environmental degradation 
worse (Homer-Dixon 1991:102). Demand-induced scarcities arise only with re-
sources that are rivalrous. A good or a resource is rivalrous when its use by one eco-
nomic actor reduces its availability for others. Examples are fisheries, cropland, for-
ests, and water (Homer-Dixon 1999:48). So when the number of people increases, 
the level of competition over the necessary resources gets higher4. As for the Niger 
Delta, the World Bank concludes that the linkages between poverty and population 
growth leading to environmental degradation are evident in both rural and urban parts 
(1995:6).  
2.3.1.3 Structural Scarcity 
Structural scarcity arises from an unequal social distribution of a resource that con-
centrates in the hands of relatively few people while the remaining population suffers 
from serious shortages (Percival & Homer-Dixon 1998:280). Looking at the pie, this 
happens when the people or the system in charge does not make the slices fair and 
equal. This type of scarcities arises primarily with resources that are excludable, 
which means that property rights or other institutions can be used to prevent access 
                                              
4 Kahl calls the combination of the first two types of scarcity and their causes environmental and demographic pres-
sure (1998).  
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to the resource by some actors. Cropland is usually excludable, and structural scar-
cities of cropland are readily apparent in many societies (Homer-Dixon 1999:48). In 
a country ruled by elites and prevalent patron-client relationships, it’s not hard to 
imagine that what little there is mostly will benefit the chosen few. The distribution 
of the scarce resources can present a substantial problem for the authorities. Each 
society has rules and laws that define the limits and nature of ownership of things 
such as farmland (Homer-Dixon 1999:52).  
2.3.2 Social Effects 
Research has identified five main social effects that can, either singly or in combina-
tion, substantially increase the probability of violence in developing countries. These 
are:  
- Constrained agricultural productivity 
- Constrained economic productivity 
- Migration of the affected people 
- Greater segmentation of society, usually along existing ethnic cleavages 
- Disruption of institutions, especially the state (Homer-Dixon 1998:80).  
It is important to note that these negative social effects also occur independently 
from environmental scarcities in different societies. They are in their own way inter-
linked and are also the negative consequence of other forces. But researchers have 
found that environmental scarcities within a society do attribute to these various 
negative effects, even if the causal chain as a whole is mutually reinforcing and have 
other external causes. Homer-Dixon emphasizes that environmental scarcity is not a 
sufficient cause for any of the social effects. Scarcity always interacts with other fac-
tors and causes to produce these social effects. Also, these effects are often causally 
interlinked, sometimes with feedback relationships (1999:80).  
The different effects that environmental and demographic pressure and unequal 
distribution have on society are prevalent all over the third world. Mostly it is observ-
able in the form of poverty, low productivity and migration. The negative effects of 
constrained agricultural and economic productivity have the consequences that the 
supply of food and the ability to purchase the things needed to sustain a life are oblit-
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erated, and the people living under these conditions are pushed further into poverty 
and hunger. Homer-Dixon predicts that decreased agricultural production is the po-
tentially most worrisome consequence of environmental change (1991:91) and that 
the potentially most important negative social effect is environmental scarcity’s effect 
on economic development (1999:88).  
The demand-induced scarcity in the wake of population growth has very distinct 
effect in addition to interaction with the others, such as population displacement, mi-
gration and urbanization. Over 90 percent of today’s population growth is occurring 
in the developing world (Homer-Dixon 1999:56). In Africa, 44 percent of the popula-
tion is under fifteen years of age. Underemployed, urbanized young men are a par-
ticularly volatile group that can be easily mobilized for radical political action 
(ibid:58).  
Structural scarcity usually happens along existing segmentations in the society. 
Elites secure or tighten their grip on a resource to profit and the scarcity is intensified 
for weaker groups. Homer-Dixon says that scarcity sharpens distinctions between 
winners and losers – between groups that profit from scarcity and those that are hurt 
(1999:96). The weakening of the state shifts the social balance of power in favour of 
challenger groups and increases opportunities of violent collective action by these 
groups against the state (Toronto group 1993-97). Theoretically, an important inter-
vening variable between environmental scarcity and civil conflict is inequality (Mid-
larsky 1998:341). So in both demand induced scarcity and structural scarcity we see 
the need for better distribution. 
The different social effects constrained agricultural output, economic decline, 
population displacement and segmentation of society have in turn a negative effect on 
the fifth social effect of environmental scarcities, namely the debilitation of political 
and social institutions. The social effects interact and reinforce each other in a similar 
manner as the different environmental scarcities do. As human population grows and 
environmental damage progresses, policy makers will have less and less capacity to 
intervene to keep this damage from producing serious social disruption, including 
conflict (Homer-Dixon 1991:79). When the agricultural output drops in rural com-
munities, this can weaken the society by causing malnutrition and disease, and pro-
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vides people an incentive to leave. Economic decline may corrode confidence in the 
national purpose, weaken the tax base, and undermine financial, legal, and political 
institutions; and mass migrations of people into a region may disrupt labour markets, 
shift class relations, and upset the traditional balance of economic and political au-
thority between ethnic groups (Homer-Dixon 1991:98).  
From what is outlined here, these intermediate social effects of environmental 
scarcity – including constrained economic productivity, population movements, so-
cial segmentation, and weakening of states – can in turn cause ethnic conflicts, insur-
gencies, and coups d’état. Homer-Dixon predicts that the social effect that is espe-
cially relevant to the connection between environmental change and acute conflict is 
the disruption of institutions and of legitimized, accepted authoritative social relations 
(1991:98).  
2.3.3 Conflict 
Defining war or violent conflict is done in several different ways, by describing 
groups opposing or simply counting the number of casualties. In a sense it is easy to 
identify a difference of opinion at the group- or international level, and the real diffi-
culty is to identify the cause of conflict. Homer-Dixon defines civil strife as a func-
tion of both the level of grievance motivating challenger groups and the opportunities 
available to these groups to act on their grievances (1994:25). Some projections have 
been made in order to see if environmental scarcities will increase the likelihood of 
interstate war, but my focus in this outline will be on internal conflict. Since also the 
majority of wars since World War Two have been intrastate in nature, this focus 
makes sense. Homer-Dixon predicts the violence to usually be sub-national, persis-
tent and diffuse (1994:6). Concerning the situation in the Niger Delta, the World 
Bank observes that conflicts between stakeholders over resource rights and uses in 
the region are endemic (1995:81).   
2.3.3.1 Grievance 
In general conflict theory it is the feeling of increased hardship that gives the incen-
tives to rebel. In theories of environmental security and theories of environmental 
conflict, this hardship is the negative effect of the scarcities outlined above.  In order 
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for these social effects to cause heightened grievance, people must perceive a relative 
decrease in their standard of living compared with other groups or compared with 
their aspirations being addressed under the status quo (Gurr 1993:126). Another 
term for this is relative deprivation. Unless the grievances are addressed, the legiti-
macy of the government will decrease, society will once again become segmented, 
and opportunities for violent collective action will increase correspondingly (Percival 
& Homer-Dixon 1998:282).  
As mentioned, the structural inequalities mostly happen along existing lines in 
the society whether they might be economic, ethnic, religious or a combination, and 
the social effects of the environmental and demographic stress in this sense increases 
forces of segmentation already existing. Segmentation breaks down social networks, 
weakens community norms and erodes trust (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998:290). 
In turn the grievances are then felt at a group level, where individuals that identifies 
with each other share the same hardship. It is the groups which mobilize most effec-
tively in response to scarcity-induced decline that are likely to be the most powerful 
and thus most likely to initiate collective action (Gurr 1985:62).  
As we see, the motivation for revolting in situations of environmental scarcity is 
the grievance felt by the affected people. Elizabeth Gilmore, Nils Petter Gleditsch, 
Päivi Lujala and Jan Ketil Rød (2005) bring in an opportunity factor in the grievance 
and revolting scenario. The rebel groups need some sort of prospect in order to go act 
on their frustrations. They hypothesise that rebellion is more likely when there is both 
grievance and opportunity. In addition to incentive, one needs opportunity. In other 
words, to act out their grievance means that they are in the possession of economic 
funds and the appropriate violent means, such as weapons and the manpower to use 
them.  This is in accordance with Kahl’s statement that the deprivation hypothesis5 
highly overpredicts incidents of civil strife (1998:83).  
                                              
5 Also known as James C. Davies’ (1962) J-curve.  
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2.3.3.2 Types of Conflict 
When it comes to the way that grievance is expressed, there are three main theoretical 
perspectives on conflict; frustration-aggression theories, group identity theories and 
structural theories. These theories are drawn upon in forming the theory of environ-
mental security. Frustration-aggression theories, suggesting that individuals become 
aggressive by something in their surroundings and by having a sense of being worse 
of than others, the “we-ness” produced by group-identity conflict and the physical 
and social factors in structural theories can be linked to the onset of environmental 
conflict. There are three principal types of conflict caused by environmental degrada-
tion, simple scarcity conflict, group-identity conflicts and relative deprivation con-
flicts (Homer-Dixon 1991:104-111).  These types of conflict are hypothesised ideal 
forms of aggression and will not be found in its pure form in the real world.  
Simple scarcity conflicts are explained by structural theories and it is the type of 
conflict that could be expected when actors rationally calculate their interest in a 
zero-sum or negative-sum situation that could arise from resource scarcity (Homer-
Dixon 1991:106). Group-identity conflicts follow logically from group-identity theo-
ries and where in certain circumstances groups will emphasize their own group while 
attacking outsiders. Such conflicts are likely to arise from the large scale movements 
of population brought about by environmental change (ibid:108). Relative depriva-
tion conflicts builds from the sense of dispossession that people feel when their live-
lihood is eroded by environmental degradation and the society in general produces 
less wealth. The sense of discontent and grievance might be translated into aggression 
as explained earlier.  
2.3.4 Adaptation 
A key finding of the Toronto group is that societies can adapt to environmental scar-
city either by using their indigenous environmental resources more efficiently or by 
decoupling from their dependence on these resources. In either case, the capacity to 
adapt depends upon the supply of social and technical “ingenuity” available in the 
society (1994-96). It is when this adaptation process is unsuccessful that all the fac-
tors involved in turn can cause violent conflict.   
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If the adaptation fails, the way that conflict can arise from environmental scarcity 
is by the negative social effects and the grievance felt by the people experiencing 
them. Kahl upholds that demographic and environmental stress can increase the level 
of grievances within societies, which in turn can provide ruling elites with incentives 
and opportunities to exploit these grievances to serve their own purposes (1998:86). 
The writings on this particular matter all suggest that it is the ones with the most re-
sources that most successfully adapt to situations with resource scarcity. The so-
called elites are in a better position to manipulate their surroundings to accommodate 
themselves in a way that makes the gap in society even greater.  
2.3.5 The Vulnerability of Developing Countries 
When it comes to developing states, it is rarely questioned that they live under condi-
tions of much poorer quality. For example, 60 to 70 percent of the world’s poor peo-
ple live in rural areas, and most depend on agriculture for their main income. Over 40 
percent of people on the planet – some 2.4 billion – use fuelwood, charcoal, straw or 
cow dung as their main source of energy. Over 1.2 billion people lack access to clean 
drinking water (Homer-Dixon 1999:13).  
Hauge and Ellingsen point to the fact that environmental degradation is found 
primarily in developing countries, in the context of disastrous national economies: 
low Gross National Product (GNP) per capita, high external debt, strong dependency 
on export of primary commodities, low levels of industrialization, and poorly devel-
oped democratic institutions (1998:303). Gurr writes that in the contemporary third 
world, hardship is a condition of life for large segments of the population living near 
the margin of subsistence (1985:56).  In an already poor country it might seem diffi-
cult to pinpoint the exact cause of the problems that is witnessed, and thereof difficult 
to evaluate to what degree environmental scarcities are the cause of the negative so-
cial effects. In some sense it might even be difficult to determine in which direction 
the arrow of causality points. If this connection is blurry, the causal chain from envi-
ronmental degradation to conflict is also a blurry one.  
Also in a poor community, people might not have the funds to look after their re-
sources in the best way to ensure that it is properly managed. The way that Ted Gurr 
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describes it, is that those poor countries which have not yet evolved strong bureau-
cratic-authoritarian states have less capacity and less resources to manage crises than 
states of the developed world. This means that they are even less likely to devise and 
implement appropriate policies than the legitimate governments of rich nations, and 
therefore are more susceptible to revolutionary upheavals (1985:71).  
In the way that many third world countries are managed, there are powerful elites 
that have the rights to land, the means of production and the positions to make deci-
sions. The neo-patrimonial system allows for patron-client relationships where deci-
sions are made on a personal basis. Corruption flourish in these conditions and the 
elites have very much the intent to stay in power and in their position of privilege.  
2.4 Democracy in Africa and Environmental Conflict 
This second part of the theoretical outline is done on the background of the interme-
diate variable of an African democracy and the arrow pointing from this variable on 
to the connection between scarcities and violent conflict corresponds to the outline I 
am now presenting. Homer-Dixon sees the disruption of legitimized institutions as a 
social effect, and when the state is at the same time met with a new set of challenges, 
he claims that as the human population grows and environmental damage progresses, 
policymakers will have less and less capacity to intervene to keep this damage from 
producing serious disruption including conflict (1991:79). He is in a way saying that 
the state is weakened by the challenges they face and at the same time the conditions, 
the scarcity and the social effect demand tougher actions by the authorities. Kahl, in 
addition claims that demographic and environmental stress need not dramatically 
weaken states for violence to erupt, violent conflict can arise from purposive actions 
of state elites themselves. 
To introduce the intermediate variable in my model I point to the scholars that 
question the Toronto group’s line of thinking. Gleditsch outlines nine problems in the 
literature on environment, population and conflict (1998), among them the problem 
that important variables are neglected, notably political and economic factors which 
have a strong influence on conflict and mediate the influence of resource and envi-
ronmental factors. In the literature produced by the Toronto group, the erosion of de-
 32 
mocratic structures is a social effect and a link in the chain of causality from envi-
ronmental degradation to violent conflict, and not an independent factor in generating 
the end result. Hauge and Ellingsen’s research point to this by considering other di-
rect causes of conflict. They conduct one of the first large-N, multivariate studies of 
environmental degradation and civil conflict where they are able not only to confirm 
some of Homer-Dixon’s hypothesis across a variety of countries, but perhaps more 
importantly assess the relative importance of environmental factors, as opposed to 
other variables, in civil conflict (Diehl 1998:276). They find that economic develop-
ment and regime type have a higher explanatory power than environmental scarcity 
does. In seeing other conflict generating factors in the same light as environmental 
degradation, the need for a broader perspective seems necessary. My angle of ap-
proach here is to look at the effects of the regime type at hand.  
2.4.1 State Capacity  
The relationship between environmental degradation and democracy is a reversal one. 
At the same time as the competition over resources undermines the democracy, the 
democracy is thought to slow down the escalation towards violent uprising. Percival 
and Homer-Dixon put it like this: Environmental scarcity increases society’s demand 
on the state while decreasing its ability to meet those needs (1998:281). He hypothe-
sizes that the spread of liberal democracy in the developing world might reduce the 
chance that environmental stress and its social effects will cause interstate conflict 
(1991:115) but the story might be different with internal conflict.  
The positive effect of a democratic regime on the environment would be seen in 
minimizing soil erosion, fouling of fresh water supplies and other types of scarcities 
by preservation being put on the political agenda. Midlarsky however, asks the ques-
tion, what if the democratic process does not necessarily operate in the best interest of 
the environment? (1998:342). He reaches the somewhat surprising conclusion con-
cerning the limitations of democracy as an instrument of environmental protection. 
Hauge and Ellingsen contributes this result to the sample size and the measures of 
democracy used, and find that it does seem to be some kind of positive linkage be-
tween democracy and environmental preservation (1998:304). The necessity to pre-
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serve resources is part of the demands on the state at the onset of environmental scar-
city and the ability to make decisions and implementations in order for the environ-
mental degradation to turn around and start preservation depends on the state’s capac-
ity.  
Project researchers and advisors, totalling about 50 experts in five countries, de-
veloped a detailed set of conceptual tools for thinking about environmental scarcity 
and state capacity that I will use to analyse the capacity of the Nigerian state.  
Indicators of State Capacity 
Indicators of the State's (or its Components') Intrinsic Characteristics: 
Human Capital The technical and managerial skill level of individuals within the state and its component parts. 
Instrumental 
Rationality 
The ability of state's components to gather and evaluate information relevant to 
their interests and to make reasoned decisions maximizing their utility. (Note 
that "utility" may be locally defined; i.e., it may reflect the narrow interests of 
the component and not the broader interests of the state or society.)  
Coherence 
The degree to which the state's components agree and act on shared ideological 
bases, objectives, and methods; also, the ability of these components to 
communicate and constructively debate ideas, information, and policies among 
themselves. 
Resilience 
The state's capacity to absorb sudden shocks, to adapt to longer-term changes in 
socio-economic conditions, and to sustainably resolve societal disputes without 
catastrophic breakdown. The opposite of "brittleness." 
Indicators of the Relations between the State (or its Components) and Society: 
Autonomy 
The extent to which the state can act independently of external forces, both 




The financial capacity of the state or of a given component of the state. This 
capacity is a function of both current and reasonably feasible revenue streams as 




The degree to which the state is successful in extending its ideology, socio-
political structures, and administrative apparatus throughout society (both 
geographically, and into the socio-economic structures of civil society); the 
responsiveness of these structures and apparatus to the local needs of the society.
Legitimacy 
The strength of the state's moral authority -- the extent to which the populace 
obeys its commands out of a sense of allegiance and duty, rather than as a result 
of coercion or economic initiative. 
 
 
(Toronto Group 1993-97) 
 
The Toronto group calls state capacity a function of variables such as the state’s fiscal 
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resources, political autonomy, legitimacy, internal coherence and responsiveness. 
One of their findings is that environmental scarcities increase financial and political 
demands on the state (1993-97).  
2.4.2 
                                             
Public Policy/Redistribution 
According to the Stockholm Declaration, States have, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of national ju-
risdiction6 (UNEP 1977). So even internationally there are guidelines to a country’s 
responsibility to preserve nature while at the same time utilizing its natural resources. 
When it comes to what kind of responsiveness one could expect from the state in a 
country faced with severe environmental scarcity, it makes sense to focus on a basic 
function of a functioning democracy, namely redistribution. Many would say that it is 
the responsibility of the government to make sure that public goods are evenly dis-
tributed through fair policies when meeting the challenges of demographic and envi-
ronmental stress. Ted Gurr says that there are patterns of public policy which can dis-
tribute the cost of economic crisis more widely; regulative and redistributive policies 
in particular minimize the advantages of economically powerful groups and provide a 
safety-net for the poor (1985:58). Midlarsky states that democracy clearly is required 
for the equitable distribution of economic largesse, or equitable redistribution in the 
absence of economic growth (1998:342). Failure in this department could be ob-
served in the form of structural scarcities.  
Another direction of the arrow of causality, stable democracies cannot long per-
sist under conditions of extreme inequality (Midlarsky 1998:345). One could say that 
fair redistribution of the nation’s wealth and resources is a key element in what de-
fines a democracy. One of the most important policy failures of the Niger Delta is the 
lack of well-defined property rights and their enforcement (World Bank 1995:xv) 
 
6 Principle 21, 1977 Stockholm Declaration, United Nations Environment Program  
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This becomes clear looking at the discontent about the way the oil wealth is distrib-
uted.  Hauge and Ellingsen say that land distribution, as well as the degradation of 
land, forest and water, is linked not only to demographic patterns, but also to eco-
nomic and political factors (1998:303).  
So obviously there is a lot that can be done in governing the scarcities to reduce 
the chance of violent conflict. Politics do play a part in shaping a society’s response 
to social stress. With the onset of migration to urban areas, the government is put un-
der pressure to provide food, shelter, energy, transport and jobs. Also, social segmen-
tation as an effect of different types of scarcities debilitates the civil society and cre-
ates a lack of trust. The loss of trust, of information flows from society to the state, 
and of private implementation of state policies reduces the reach and responsiveness 
of the state at the local level. The state's failure to meet local needs then depresses its 
legitimacy (Toronto Group 1993-93).  
2.4.3 State Exploitation Hypotesis  
To stay in power, all regimes, even the most authoritarian ones, require some base of 
social support. In a country experiencing severe demographic and environmental 
pressures, Kahl claims, that state elites are likely to fear an erosion of this support if 
they are unable to meet societal demands. Threats to a regime thus create incentives 
for state elites to search for strategies that will stabilize their base, mobilize new sup-
porters, and co-opt or crush political opponents (1998:87-88). This perspective fo-
cuses on the roles of the elites in a country, and seen in context with structural scar-
city, this pre-face to conflict has a disruptive effect on the society when it reinforces 
already skewed distribution. Demographic and environmental stress according to 
Kahl, provides elites with golden opportunities to perpetuate their rule (1998:88). 
Institutional inclusivity is the degree of witch social groups are empowered to take 
part in the rule or the decision-making (ibid:90).  
The Toronto group finds that resource scarcities affect the state via their effect on 
elites. As they become more powerful, these groups are increasingly able to ignore 
state dictates, shirk taxes on their greater wealth, and penetrate the state to make it 
do their bidding. In particular, they often lobby to change the property rights and 
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other laws governing the use of scarce resources such as water, land, and forests 
(Toronto Group 1993-97). The predatory behaviour of the elites then further invokes 
violent uprising among less powerful groups and undermines state legitimacy at the 
same time. Like in the writings of Ted Gurr, the underlying rationale is that economi-
cally advantaged groups are better able to use market forces and political influence to 
maintain their positions (1985:58).   
2.4.4 African Democracy 
The major difficulty in theorizing about democracy and the environment probably 
arises from the view of democracy as undifferentiated (Midlarsky 1998:346). This 
statement also points to the problem of studying third world countries in the same 
context as countries of the first world, assuming that the denominators are the same 
and that a comparison can be made. Dokken and Bøås (2002) writes that most schol-
ars on Africa agree that the African state is a type of state that exists in a grey area 
between a legal bureaucratic-rational framework and a person based framework, and 
that there is an official division between the job and the person and also between poli-
tics and economy. In most cases however, this division exists only on paper. In this 
type of state decisions are likely to be made on a personal basis rather than for the 
general public.   
The personal relationships open for corruption, patron-client relationships and 
rent-seeking actors. The African state hence does not fit the ideal westphalian model 
of the state, and needs to be looked at in a different light. Neo-patrimonialism, which 
Medard calls a kind of hybrid of patrimonialism and bureaucracy (1996), is one way 
of describing the African condition. Chabal and Daloz describe the state as being illu-
sory and substantial at the same time and this makes the state both strong and power-
less (1999:9).  
2.5 African Adaptation 
As mentioned the likelihood of severe environmental degradation is larger in the third 
world, but also the capacity of developing countries to respond to environmental and 
other challenges is smaller than in rich first world countries. Developing states do by 
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definition have less financial, material, and intellectual resources. These countries 
have less ‘slack’, so resource crisis will push more people more quickly to and below 
the subsistence margin (Gurr 1985:71). He goes on to say that the bureaucracies in 
these states have not yet developed in a way that is able and have the resources to 
manage crisis. Thus they are even less likely to devise and implement appropriate 
policies than the legitimate governments of rich nations, and therefore are more sus-
ceptible to revolutionary upheavals (1985:71).  
Looking at the state capacity there is a lot to be said about what is required from 
the government of a country facing the different environmental changes. Environ-
mental scarcity increases the financial and political demands on governments from 
the lowered production and constraining rural development. Furthermore, the re-
source loss can reduce the income of elites directly dependent on resource extraction; 
these elites usually turn to the state for compensation. Scarcity also expands mar-
ginal groups that need help from government by producing rural poverty and by dis-
placing people in cities where they demand food, shelter, transport, energy, and em-
ployment (Homer-Dixon 1994:25).  
Optimists, or neoclassical economists and so-called distributionists will say that 
the more heads – the more ideas on how to cope with the scarcity and that the actual 
scarcity itself or new developments in national and international economies will 
stimulate a sufficient flow of ingenuity. Reason for optimism for food production and 
the wellbeing of the third world came in the form of the green revolution, where the 
use of new technology enabled farmers everywhere to get more from their crops by 
using fertilizers. Homer-Dixon outlines a more pessimistic view with four factors that 
are limiting the supply of ingenuity, market failure, social friction, capital availability 
and constraints on science (1995:597-604) All of which are part of the disadvantage 
of third world countries in the form of underdeveloped economic institutions, “unsta-
ble” societies, less financial and human capital and less access to modern science and 
knowledge. The capacity of developing countries to effectively respond to the chal-
lenges of environmental changes and its consequences is going to depend on the 
country’s capacity to respond to the complex interaction that happens at the onset of 
degradation in both nature and society. Homer-Dixon states that of particular impor-
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tance are the society’s prevailing land use practices, land distribution, and market 
mechanisms within the agricultural sector (1991:99). In other words, the importance 
of fair redistribution and not necessarily the marked forces spurred by self-interest 
thought to encourage conservation, technological innovation and resource substitu-
tion as outlined by for example Julian Simon (1981). 
In explaining why some societies do adapt to environmental scarcities while oth-
ers don’t, the Toronto group points to something they call ingenuity, a kind of re-
sourcefulness and creativity at the onset of difficulties. This is different from the neo-
classical economic view in that it focuses on the gap between the first- and the third 
world in not only technical ideas but also ideas about social organization (Homer-
Dixon 1995). Homer-Dixon goes on to say that the state plays the central role in es-
tablishing this system of institutions. It must also provide other supports to an effi-
cient market, including a competent civil service, high rates of literacy, a well-
functioning infrastructure of transportation, communication, and irrigation systems, 
and a relatively egalitarian distribution of wealth (1995:599). One way of putting it 
is by saying that a lot of third world societies are in a race between a need of ingenu-
ity and the ability to solve problems and their capacity to supply it, and that unlike the 
optimistic neoclassical economic view, the supply of solutions is not logically follow-
ing the need for them since the need keeps increasing. 
2.6 Summary and Model  
Pollution and degradation of the environment, population growth and unequal distri-
bution cause environmental scarcity. Environmental scarcity causes negative social 
effects, among them poverty, migration, decreased agricultural output and weakening 
of institutions. These social effects increase the level of grievance, combined with 
everything else - a conflict might erupt. In a poor society, where grievance and depri-
vation is already a factor, the effect of further impoverishment and environmental 
change will most likely hit harder. Scarcity can sharply increase demands on key in-
stitutions such as the state and at the same time decrease their capacity to meet those 
demands. With the existence of a functioning state, the causal pathway to conflict 
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might be slowed down, but this institution is also under attack from the same factors 
producing the grievance and the conflict.  
The disruption of the state is in the theory of environmental security a social ef-
fect, but I want to ask the question what independent effect does a state in the form of 
an African democracy on the pathway to conflict outlined by scholars in environ-
mental security.  Hauge and Ellingsen claim that the literature and research on envi-
ronmental degradation and domestic armed conflict fails to take into consideration 
other conflict-generating factors. They and others claim that Homer-Dixon and his 
colleagues ignore the more direct links between economic and political factors and 
domestic armed conflict.   
 
Grievance Caused by 
Scarcities 
    
      Æ   Violent Conflict 




In my model outlined above, the intermediate variable of a democratic regime will 
function as conflict generating factors in addition to environmental scarcities, but 
with a reverse effect – the new democratic regime in Nigeria as interference to violent 
conflict caused by environmental scarcities in the Niger Delta. This is in order to get 
a larger view on the environmental security perspective. With this I propose that the 
democracy in Africa variable has an independent effect on the causal links between 
environmental scarcity and violence, because although environmental scarcity is a 
cause of conflict, it is not necessarily also a catalyst (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998:314). 
I wish to see then if the presence of a democratic regime in an African country has 
any effect on the wheel of motion towards conflict that the different scarcities might 
start.  
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3. Empirical Background  
3.1 Introduction  
Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas call it the place Where Vultures Feast (2003), and 
descriptions of the Niger Delta shows it is one of our world’s most volatile and de-
graded areas. One aim of this chapter is to try and outline the adverse conditions that 
the local population has to live under and to try to describe some of the hardship that 
they endure because of not only conflict in the region, but the extreme environmental 
degradation. To bring nature into social science, is at best not an easy task. Some will 
perhaps say all together not possible, and at the same time raise questions about the 
link between environmental degradation and conflict. My point of departure in order 
to write this thesis is that nature and our surroundings provide the livelihood for peo-
ple, and can therefore not easily be dismissed as having an effect on how people 
think. This effect is especially visible in rural and less developed parts of the world 
where the day to day life to a large degree revolves around reaping the earth.  
The other thing I want to document in this chapter is the political and economic 
factors determining the state capacity of Nigeria. I will introduce characteristics of the 
Niger Delta and the new sub-Saharan democracy that play a part in the complexity 
around the current conflict and society as a whole. As far as political science goes, 
this part is the more “mainstream” empirical background. However, political and eco-
nomic conditions on the sub-Saharan continent differ as we know from the traditional 
Western view in a lot of ways, so a clear presentation is in order.  
3.2 Nigeria 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is located in western Africa, and with its more than 
130 million citizens7 it is the most populous country in Africa. Nigeria was granted 
full independence from Britain in 1960, and in 1963 it proclaimed itself as a federal 
republic. After independence followed a long period of corrupt and brutal military 
dictators and counter-coups and a civil war from 1967 - 70 over the secessionist terri-
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tory of Biafra (CIA 2006). The country was returned to civilian rule in 1999. The 
new civilian president Olusegun Obasanjo made serious democratic efforts after win-
ning the election in 1999. He retired many military officers in political positions, es-
tablished a panel to investigate human rights violations, freed prisoners held without 
charge and located secret funds hidden by previous regimes, but there is still a long 
way towards a fully functioning democratic state (IFES, Nigeria). Corruption is wide-
spread, and there are numerous ethnic and religious clashes around the country. The 
first peaceful transition from one democratically elected government to another hap-
pened in April 2003 when Obasanjo was re-elected, even though many cried out foul 
play.  
Nigeria is the world’s ninth largest oil producer. It also sits on the world’s ninth 
largest proven oil reserves and the seventh largest proven gas reserves (EIA 2006). 
Despite 47 years experience of petroleum production, Nigeria still faces considerable 
challenges in transforming the oil sector into a substantial value adding activity for 
the Nigerian business, not to say the Nigerian society as a whole (FIOH 2006:8). The 
legislation of the new democracy reads that the income from the production of oil 
goes to the central government and that at least 13 percent of the revenue derived 
from natural resources should be paid to the state where it is produced (HRW 
2002:2).  
3.2.1 
                                                                                                                                           
Nigerian Government  
The country is administrated through 36 states and the federal capital territory. The 
Nigerian constitution is inspired by the American. Like the United States, Nigeria is 
also a diverse country with a lot of different peoples and interests. The general idea is 
that a divided society should be governed in a decentralized manner, the system being 
federalism where some of the decision making is delegated to the different state gov-
ernments (see Albert P. Blaustein). As a product of colonialism, the country can be 
7 It is hard to know the exact number of Nigerians, all figures are projections. A census is taking place in the spring of 
2006, but now as in the past, this is a major source of controversy (see Kokole 1994).  
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said to be a joining of people and regions in an artificial entity. However, it is a fed-
eral system, with what some would say - too centralized power. 
Jibrin Ibrahim makes the following observation: Over the past four decades, the 
Nigerian state has evolved from a federal polity characterised by three politically 
strong regions each controlled by the elite of a majority ethnic group, to a highly 
centralized system in which the so-called federating states have no real autonomous 
power and are at the beck and call of a strong centre in which enormous powers are 
vested in the hands of one person and one institution, the president and the presi-
dency (2000:57). With this, there is a sense that the central government is too control-
ling when it comes to matters of the states. In the Niger Delta, the control that the 
central government exceeds over the oil revenue is the major source of frustration 
with the government’s revenue allocation system. Others recognize the power the 
states are given within the constitution, and make this a governing issue because you 
cannot have two sovereignties (Obe 2004). The prime example of this would be how 
only some of the states practices Islamic Sharia law. As we can see, the federal sys-
tem in Nigeria is a huge source of controversy.  
On a scale of democracy, the Freedom House lists Nigeria as being ‘partly free’. 
Most notably they point to the fact the Nigerians can change their government de-
mocratically, but the widespread corruption and violence keeps the country’s score 
from being ‘free’. International observers noted different kinds of irregularities dur-
ing the 2003 election like ballot-stuffing and alterations of results (2005). Nigeria was 
ranked 144 out of 146 countries surveyed in Transparency International's Corruption 
Perceptions Index (2004). 
3.3 The Conditions of the Niger Delta 
The Niger Delta, as defined officially by the Nigerian Government, extends over 
about 70,000 square kilometres and makes up 7.5% of Nigeria’s land mass. It 
includes land in Abia State, Akwa Ibom State, Bayelsa State, Cross River State, Delta 
State, Edo State, Imo State, Ondo State and Rivers State. Some 20 million people of 
more than 40 ethnic groups, speaking some 250 dialects live in the Delta (Wikipedia, 
Niger Delta). Their livelihoods are primarily based around natural commodities and 
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44.2 percent of the population work in the agriculture, fishery and foresty sectors 
(FIOH 2006:15).  
The Niger Delta was part of the Biafra seccesionist territory, and it has a long 
violent history (see Okonta and Douglas 2003 and Wole Soyinka 1996). The region 
has been getting recent attention because of different groups clashing, violent youths8 
and the kiddnapping of foreign oil workers.  
3.3.1 
                                             
Economy 
It might seem like a paradox to look at Nigeria in the light of resource scarcities since 
of all the Sub-Saharan countries, it actually makes a reasonable profit on the export of 
its main commodity, namely oil. Almost all the oil produced by Nigeria – 
approximately 2 million barrels a day, comes from the Niger Delta (AAAS, Niger 
Delta Project).  Rivers, Bayelsa, and Delta states alone currently procuse three-
fourths of the country’s crude oil (Okonta and Douglas 2003:18). But it is a monocul-
tural economy, since the oil boom in the 1970s Nigeria has neglect the agricultural 
base in favour of an unhealthy dependency on crude oil. In 2000 oil and gas exports 
accounted for 98 percent of export earnings and about 83 percent of federal govern-
ment revenue (Countryreports.org, Nigeria) 
The Niger Delta Development Commission, a government initiative to the  de-
velopment issues in the delta reports that according to the World Bank report (1995), 
GNP per capita in the region is below the national average of US$280 despite the 
high population growth rate combined with severe habitable land constraints. Simi-
larly, health indicators are low and they lag far behind the country average. There are 
disproportionately high fatality rates from water-borne diseases, malnutrition, and 
poor sanitation among others. The quantity and quality of housing and infrastructure 
are deficient in much of the region. Only about 20 percent to 24 percent of rural 
communities and less than 60 percent of urban communities in the region have access 
to safe drinking water (NDDC, the Niger Delta). 
 
8 The word “youth” in Nigeria is used effectively to describe all young men who have not reached the status of 





The Niger Delta is one of the world’s largest wetlands, and the largest in Africa. The 
mangrove forest is the largest in Africa (HRW 1999). The Niger Delta region has the 
high biodiversity characteristic of extensive swamp and forest areas, with many 
unique species of plants and animals (Ibid). It is home to not only 20 million people, 
but also three-quarters of the fresh water fish caught in West Africa, mangrove trees 
providing medicine, fruit, raw materials and protective barriers for the coast (Okonta 
and Douglas 2003:63). The same ecosystem that all this oil is extracted from feeds 
and supports almost 20 million people. Most are minorities that historically found 
safe haven in the delta; they now struggle to maintain their identities and livelihoods 
as part of its ecosystem (AAAS, The Niger Delta Project). 
The American Association for the Advancement of Science concludes that the 
Niger Delta is one of the world’s most endangered ecosystems. They point to an al-
most complete lack of environmental concerns from all instances as part of the prob-
lem besides the oil production (AAAS, The Niger Delta Project). Michael Watts de-
scribes the situation in the Niger Delta as an environmental nightmare (2004:287). 
Peter P. Ekeh states that there is no region of the world that is as much subject to en-
vironmental abuses as Nigeria's Niger Delta (Waado, Editors Introduction). Human 
Rights Watch (1999) observes that the mangrove forest is still relatively intact with 
only 5 to 10 percent has been lost to settlement or oil activities. The lowland rainfor-
est however, is virtually gone. 
Accountability  
The companies that have been operating in the Niger Delta, some for up to 40 years, 
have long been accused for not taking the proper environmental impact assessments. 
In the past, critical analysis has identified the Federal, State and Local Governments 
to be in complicity with the oil companies therefore providing implicit protection to 
the oil companies’ lack of social responsibility (NDDC, The Niger Delta). The tech-
nology and means of value adding is in the hands of the oil companies and not the 
Nigerians. For instance, one of the reasons for the extensive use of gas flaring is that 
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the local community does not constitute a market for this type of energy (ERA 
2005:23).  
The Nigerian government’s accountability show in the way they are attempting to 
do something about the problem. The new democratic government do have an envi-
ronmental minister, but the management of environmental problems in Nigeria is not 
given a lot of administrative attention (see Mba et al. 2004). Nigerian governments as 
far back as 1969 have requested the oil companies to set up facilities to use the asso-
ciated gas from their operations. In 1980 the government changed the legislation so 
that fines would be given when the gas was flared and not utilized, but the govern-
ment could not and still can’t enforce this regulation (ERA 2005:24-25).   
Also when it comes to accountability, the high level of corruption throughout the 
entire country is worth mentioning again. A recent example of bad economic practice 
in the country happened when auditors uncovered a huge difference in the oil reve-
nues. On May 4, the Daily Champion reported: President Olusegun Obasanjo yester-
day stalled the presentation of an audit report on the nation's oil and gas sector fol-
lowing inability of the audit firm, Hart Group to trace a $250 million (about N33.3 
billion) net difference and $1.264 billion (about N168 billion) gross difference in the 
accounts (Adelaya 2006).  
3.4 Environmental and Population Pressures  
Pollution was a problem reserved for the modern world as it came with the increased 
industrialization, but now the degradation of the environment as a consequence of 
human activity is becoming a highly present factor in the third world. In the Niger 
Delta, most of the country’s crude oil is extracted, and this is what constitutes most of 
the environmental problems for the local population. The director of Environmental 
Rights Action Nnimmo Bassey (2001) says that centuries and millennia of human 
activity has left its mark on the environment and that the result has been that the 
higher the cultural civilization we have managed to build from transformed nature, 
the higher the level of devastation we have wrought on the environment. Zak Harmon 
(1997) lists some of the environmental damage as declining agricultural productivity; 
land degradation, disease, erosion, fisheries depletion, illegal logging, deforestation, 
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proliferation of exotic species, toxic and hazardous substance pollution, vehicular 
emissions, sewage and municipal wastes.  
3.4.1 Supply Induced Scarcity 
There is supply induced scarcity when there is a shortage of resources. In this con-
text, the underlying rationale for this type of scarcity will be human activity like pol-
lution of various kind causing degradation and depletion of renewable resources. In 
the Niger Delta, the main human activity causing the pollution of the environment is 
the production of crude oil and natural gasses. These operations have essentially 
caused degradation to the environment within an extremely fragile eco-system and 
destroyed the traditional livelihoods of the Niger Delta. Pollution has affected the 
atmosphere, soil fertility, waterways and mangroves, wildlife, plant life, aqua-life 
and, has resulted in acid rain. Fishing and agriculture are no longer productive 
enough to feed the area and, in the Ogoni region, for example, food is imported in an 
area once known as the food-basket of the Niger Delta. The population is prone to 
respiratory problems and partial deafness (NDDC, The Niger Delta).  
3.4.1.1 Oil Spills 
The World Bank estimates that oil companies in Rivers and Delta states spill about 
9000 cubic feet of oil in three hundred major accidents yearly. On its part, Shell says 
it spilled an average of 7350 barrels of oil a year between 1989 and 1994, and that a 
total of 221 spills occurred in the course of its operations during the period (Okonta 
and Douglas 2003:66). The actual number might be a lot higher. As an example, ac-
cording to the Human Rights Watch there was a major spill from a Shell wellhead on 
the land of the Ogoni population on April 29, 2001, and even though the production 
in the area remains closed, the wellheads were never properly secured. Oil sprayed up 
in a fountain over a very wide area, damaging farmland. The cleanup operation at the 
site had not been completed almost one year later (2002:20-21). There was a debate 
between the local Ogoni population and Shell over who was to blame for the spill, 
Shell claiming vandalization and the Ogonis claiming corrosion and neglect by the oil 
company. Oil companies do not pay compensation where spills are caused by vandal-
ism, but the damage to the pipes is rarely if ever caused by those who suffer the dam-
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age from the spill, and they can thus face economic hardship (see ERA 2005, Okonta 
and Douglas 2003). Their method of cleaning is however very questionable as the 
soil is scooped up and set on fire. Such fires have resulted in massive devastation of 
farmlands, forests, rivers and communal property (ERA 2005:15).   
The impact of all oil related activities on the environment of the Niger Delta is 
widespread and substantial (World Bank 1995:xi). Impacts of oil spills are as can be 
imagined, potentially devastating for natural life. According to the Oil Spill Intelli-
gence Report, oil spills have a negative impact on wildlife including birds, mammals 
and fish stocks (Waado, Oil Spill). One observer states that: It is noteworthy that, the 
devastating consequences of the spill of this crude in the Niger Delta region with its 
eventual hazards on both aerial and terrestrial environs tantamount to an irreversi-
ble chain effect on both the bio- diversity and human safety (Akpofure et al.)  
3.4.1.2 Gas Flaring 
Travelling in the area is like flying over Dante’s inferno. Wherever you look you see 
those goddammned flares was the statement of Clive Wicks from the World Wide 
Fund for Nature after a tour of oil installations in Nigeria (Okonta and Douglas 
2003:67). Gas flaring is one way of disposing of unwanted gasses from the extraction 
process. It has been deemed illegal by international instances and the Nigerian gov-
ernment, but it still being done throughout the region. The light and noise from the 
flames is constant, and observer Greg Campbell describes a village where no one un-
der the age of 29 have ever known a dark and peaceful nights sleep because of flar-
ing. The flares roar like a waterfall and can be heard half a mile away. Also the tem-
peratures are higher than average (2001). When the gas is flared it produces thick 
soot, which contaminates the water when it rains (ERA 2005:23-25).  
The effects of the flaring are serious, imminent and constant and it produces 
emissions that are more than the combined emissions of the rest of sub-Saharan Af-
rica (ERA 2005:24). Some of the severe consequences from the gas flaring are: light 
and noise pollution; people near the installations have their nights turning into days 
and can become half-deaf from the roaring sound, acid rain and air pollution; destroy-
ing the environment and their food sources and making people prone to respiratory 
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diseases, and the flames create heat and places of danger. The toxic emissions have 
also been linked to serious health consequences, some being strange illnesses and 
even stillbirths and deaths (see ERA 2005, Okonta and Douglas 2003, FIOH 2006, 
Osefoh 2004, HRW 1999). Acid rain gets into peoples drinking waters, one scientist 
found 250 – 37000 times the legal E.U. standard of total petroleum hydrocarbon 
(TPH) in the water of five villages (Okonta and Douglas 2003:93). 
3.4.2 
3.4.3 
Demand Induced Scarcity  
This kind of scarcity is experienced when the number of individuals competing for 
the resources surpasses the actual amount of resources found. According to NDDC 
the population of the Niger Delta increased greatly in the 1980s, and at the same time, 
the awareness of the extreme consequences of the constant pollution was getting in-
ternational attention. Nigeria is today the most populous country in Africa with its 
more than 130 million inhabitants, and with an annual growth rate of 2.45 percent 
(countrystudies.org, Nigeria) one could say that the country is experiencing a degree 
of demographic pressure. The Niger Delta also has a particularly high population 
density, 246 per square kilometre being the average (FIOH 2006:15), almost twice 
that of the national average of 124.98 per square kilometre (CIA 2006).  
Rapid population growth is increasingly exerting pressure on cultivable land, a 
good part of which is prone to flooding almost all year (Okonta and Douglas 
2003:19). The visible result of such an increase in the population can be seen in the 
cities in the region. Okonta and Douglas observe that the population of Port Harcourt 
and the other major towns is literally exploding (2003:19). Urbanization and poverty 
does not mix well, unemployment and crime are the likely results. 
Structural Scarcity  
This last type of scarcity happens when the resources available are not evenly distrib-
uted. In this regard, one major concern among the people in the delta is that they feel 
that the government revenues are not equally distributed. The region producing the 
country’s wealth is actually on average poorer and less developed than the rest of Ni-
geria. The GNP per capita in the region is below the national average of US$280. As 
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mentioned, only 13 percent of the revenues from Nigeria’s oil production is allocated 
back to the state where it was produced.  
Spilled oil does not discriminate, but the Ogoni is one ethnic group that feel like 
they as a minority have been especially targeted in what Okonta and Douglas call a 
ecological genocide, as very little was done to clean up the spills in their region 
(2003: 74-81). The oil also plays a part in the societal construction as it creates a 
petro-elite when only some people are profiting from the production. 
3.4.4 Grievance 
A lot of the pollution is to a large degree observable. The gas flaring in the sky and 
the dirty rivers and fields are examples of that. But some of the environmental degra-
dation is more hidden, like the loss of biodiversity in this large wetland. Another fac-
tor that perhaps is not as visible, and not easily empirically collected, is the way that 
environmental degradation effects people on a more psychological level. It is likely 
that the full ramification of the widespread pollution is not yet fully understood.  
It is natural to think that the local population are experiencing physical and health 
related problems that can be ascribed to the poor living conditions and the social ef-
fects of the environmental degradation. However their mental frustration about these 
grievances is not easily identified until it is seen as actions. One attempt of conveying 
the horror is done below, in the exert from the poem We thought it was oil But it was 
blood by Nnimmo Bassey (ERA).  
Dried tear bags 
Polluted streams 
Things are real 
Only when found in dreams 
We see their Shells 
Behind military shields 
Evil, horrible evil gallows called oilrigs 
Drilling our souls 
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A group of researchers travelling in the Delta region made the following observa-
tion: It is surprising to note that, most places we went, the extent of damage on the 
biodiversity, vegetation, psycho-socio-physio-economic integrity of the victims were 
sincerely beyond human description (Akpofure et al.). A farmer/hunter/fisherman 
made the following testimony: I was going to  my farmland with my wife…to harvest 
cassava and check my traps in the Mini-Ihe forest to see whether the traps had 
caught some bush pigs and grass cutters we use for food. At about 10 a.m., just in 
front of us we heard a huge explosion and suddenly bad odour of gas mixed with fuel, 
and later a big tongue of fire ravaging nearby farmlands, forests, including my own. 
See! All my farmlands of cassava, traps and fishponds are burnt (Mr. Woke quoted in 
FIOH 2006:24). As their local community is no longer self-sustainable, they get the 
incentive to leave. Indigenous people seeing themselves as custodians of nature and 
resources see their foundation of life disappearing. 
When it comes to health and general quality of life, the oil production has a huge 
impact, even if some might say that it is not scientifically proven. One indicator is life 
expectancy, the average life expectancy in Nigeria is 46.8 years, and this figure is 
lower in the outer Delta (FIOH 2006:15). Another cause of emotional distress is the 
fact that graveyards have been dug up and its content dumped in the ocean to make 
roads to well heads (Okonta and Douglas 2003:83) 
In addition to the frustration felt concerning the unequal distribution of the wealth 
coming from the oil production, its fair to say that the local population is bearing the 
negative consequence of the extraction. News of ethnic militant groups attacking the 
pipelines in protest of the way that the oil companies exploit the local communities 
and impoverish the local population is in a way symptomatic for this grievance.  
3.5 The Conflict in the Niger Delta 
The conflict in the Niger Delta is not one easily understood as there are a lot of forces 
and interests at work. A Human Rights Watch report state that the conflict during 
2003 has lead to the killing of hundreds of people, the displacement of thousands and 
the destruction of hundreds of properties (HWR 2003:2). Samuel A. Igbatayo writes 
that since the 1990s, the Niger Delta has degenerated into a dangerous theatre of vio-
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lent conflict, sustained by ethnic militias, tribal warlords and misguided youth 
(2004/2005). BBC news (2006) reports that a recent report commissioned by Shell 
said that the level of conflict in the region is comparable to Colombia and Chechnya.  
One explanation is to look at how there is a struggle among local leaders for oil 
revenue and government funds (HRW 2005b) and the inhabitants of the Niger Delta 
protesting against the distribution of the government. Attitude surveys have shown a 
phenomenal change in public opinion in the Niger Delta from 2000 to 2003 (FIOH 
2006:26). More interestingly, the attitude in the Niger Delta is much more negative 
than the rest of the country. To the question “Overall how satisfied are you with the 
way democracy works in Nigeria?” only 13 percent answered fairly/very satisfied in 
the Niger Delta, as to 37 percent of other Nigerians (Ross 2004:42). This shows the 
inhabitants dissatisfaction with the central administration. When it comes to local 
uprising against the federal government, the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force 
(NDPVF) declared all out war on the Nigerian state on September 27th 2004 (HRW 
2005a:19).  
Some of the local uprising against the oil companies has come in the form of 
crowds carrying palmleaves, but it is the violent attacks that gets the most attention. 
The Guardian (2006) reports that a group known as the Movement for the Emancipa-
tion of the Niger Delta (MEND) has admitted responsibility for a number of attacks 
against oil installations in the region resulting in the loss of lives security forces and 
oil workers, and four was kidnapped. MEND is asking for the payment of $1.5 billion 
to Bayelsa State to compensate for the pollution of the environment and the immedi-
ate release of the leader of NDPVF, Alhaji Mujahid Asari Dokubo, who is standing 
trial for treason. They are said to be trying to reach their goals by crippling the oil 
economy in the country.  
Igbatayo reports that ethnic groups in the Niger Delta have batteled each other 
over local governance and the control of natural resources, resulting in the maiming 
and killing of innocent people, including women and children (2004/2005). In the 
Delta state, there are three ethnic groups involved in the violence – the Ijaw, Itsekiri 
and the Urhobo. Human Rights Watch asseses that the Itsekiri, the smalles of the 
three, have been the main victims of violence largely at the hands of the organized 
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Ijaw militia (2003:2). Both the Urhobo and the Ijaws alleged that the distribution of 
the electoral wards was in favour of the Itsekiri (IRIN 2001).  
When the different local groups are fighting each other, it is also often related to 
the oil buisness. HRW identifies the main perpetrators of the violence as two armed 
groups, the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Niger Delta 
Vigilante (NDV). There is alo a conflict between the Bille and the Kalabari people, 
which has probably lead to more than one hundred deaths, centered on the 
“ownership” of oil facilities and the benefits that flow from being designated “host 
community” by an oil company according to Human Rights Watch (2002:8). The 
different youth groups are essentially fighting each other over bunkering rutes to steal 
and sell oil illegally. In a way, the fight for resources is a fight over territory, because 
that is where the resources are.  
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4. Analysis 
4.1 Introduction  
Article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ rights (1981) states that: all 
people shall have the right to (a) safe and generally satisfactory environment favour-
able to their development. The aim of the first party of the analysis is to see if this 
human right is being respected in the Niger Delta by identifying traits of the situation 
in the Niger Delta that is consistent with the theoretical outline. To analyse the rela-
tionship between environmental scarcities and the outbreak of violent conflict from 
the outlined theoretical framework, I will work my way from the definition of scarci-
ties, the social effects arising from these scarcities and the subsequent movement to-
wards violence before I look at the intervening variable of an African democracy in 
the case of the Niger Delta.  
The second part of the analysis is based on the conclusion of Hauge and El-
lingsen’s research, saying that environmental degradation alone is not a sufficient 
cause of conflict. Other critics of the theory of environmental security have also 
pointed to the possibility of other factors contributing more to the upsurge of violence 
than the actual resource question, like the regime type. In this thesis, the regime type 
is a new democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. What this form of state system will have 
on the possibility of conflict rising from environmental scarcity is what will be ex-
plored in the end of this chapter. The nature of the Nigerian state, the constitutional 
design and the prevalence of neo-patrimonial frameworks within the society will be 
looked at, and state exploration hypothesis will be used to look at the predatory elites. 
The common denominator for all these facets is the money coming in from the pro-
duction of oil. Oil appears to be “leaking in” through most levels of society.  
In order to make the causal steps from observing the environmental damage and 
its causes to the social effects, I will be using the empirical descriptions of the condi-
tion of the Niger Delta. I will be keeping in mind that the pathway to conflict, espe-
cially in this case, is not a simple one, but having the focus on the conflict on scarcity 
of renewable resources and its social effects as the conflict generating factor. To see 
to what degree the conflict in the Niger Delta can be attributed to the causes outlined 
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in the theory of environmental security, I will follow the theoretical framework pre-
viously laid out.  
The empirical contribution to the analysis will be based on general observations 
of the natural surroundings that can be made by both professionals on the subject of 
environmental degradation and by local people affected by the pollution. This is be-
cause it is the aim of the analysis to see the depletion of the land like a local resident 
would, in order to pinpoint the frustration and grievances.  
4.2 Scarcity in the Niger Delta 
Looking at the various descriptions of the condition of the environment in the Niger 
Delta made in the previous chapter, and the fact that the rainforest is gone (HRW 
1999) the label environmental nightmare doesn’t seem too far fetched. It is a rela-
tively easy task to identify the three different types of environmental scarcity that 
Homer-Dixon and the Toronto-group outline in the Niger Delta. It is clear that the 
renewable resources like cropland, forests, water and fish stocks are disappearing in 
the areas where people are depending on them for survival live. There are many di-
rectly affected by the immense environmental changes because it affects their very 
livelihood. Since everyone depends on clean water, not only fishermen and farmers 
are affected. One could also easily say that the structural scarcity makes a greater im-
pact on people in a situation where resources are already scarce.    
One potential problem with analysing the impact of oil pollution in the Niger 
Delta is the fact that neither the oil companies nor the Nigerian government have 
funded the scientific research that would allow an objective assessment of the damage 
caused by exploration and production. She has claimed that the credibility of the en-
vironmental reports available is very low and that a lot of the damage that these re-
ports point to is not a direct result from the oil extraction (HRW 1999).  And even if 
the oil is spilled, it’s not the oil company’s fault and they blame it on vandalism, as is 
done 80 percent of the time when spills occur. In cases of sabotage, in accordance to 
Nigerian law, the oil companies do not pay compensation (ibid). The oil companies 
are however required to take the necessary precautions to prevent pollution through 
the Nigerian Petroleum regulations. Still many will claim that they allow practices in 
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Nigeria that would never be tolerated in North America or in Europe. Shell has even 
defended the idea of national rather than international environmental standards and 
one director claimed that higher environmental standards could harm local econo-
mies. Human Rights Watch point out that Shell keeps on flaring gas illegally and that 
many of the pipes that run above ground are much older than the estimated 15 years 
maximum lifespan, and the corrosion make further spills more likely. It is not only 
the spilling of oil that causes environmental problems, the oil companies also build 
roads and canals that are destructive in a different way.  
Nevertheless it is not really important to the context of this thesis whether or not 
the oil companies are right in their assumptions because it is the perceived destruc-
tion, real or not that will make up the incentives for the affected people to revolt. But 
it is not hard to imagine that the renounce of guilt from the oil producers have a psy-
chological effect on the people in the Niger Delta, fuelling the frustration and the 
grievance since their claims and outcries are not taken seriously. 
4.2.1.1 Supply Induced Scarcity  
As we remember, a situation with supply induced scarcity happens when the re-
sources that people depend on are degenerated faster than they renew themselves so 
that a shortage of the resources is created. For example, a forest that is cut down takes 
a long time to grow back even if the natural conditions allow re-growth. To cleanse 
polluted waters is not an easy task, even with the equipment and the resources, and 
cropland lost to floods and oil spills is not restored over night. In this view one might 
even call the changes that the oil companies impose on the environment in the Niger 
Delta irreversible, at least for the foreseeable future. Because even though resources 
like forests, crops and fresh water theoretically can renew themselves, in a damaged 
environment they are not given the opportunity to do so.  
From the seven major environmental problems facing various parts of the world 
identified earlier by Homer-Dixon, acid depletion, deforestation, degradation of agri-
cultural land, overuse and pollution of water supplies and depletion of fish stocks are 
with certainty problems in the Niger Delta. In addition to gas flaring and the emission 
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of fumes/gasses into the atmosphere is as agreed on by most scientists, contributing to 
global warming9. 
It can hardly be questioned that the mangrove forests and fresh water swamps in 
the Delta area are experiencing severe degradation. This degradation is clearly also a 
danger to the local residents’ way of life. When the farmlands are left barren and 
there is no clean water, the frustration of the locals is not hard to understand. Another 
point to make is that most of the people in the delta region have a livelihood based on 
fishing and farming, so the scarcities constitutes a cut not only in their food stock but 
also in their economic base. 
4.2.1.2 Demand Induced Scarcity  
An increase in the demand means there are more people in need of a resource than 
exists of that resource to go around. This happens either by an increase in population 
or by an increase in the demand for the resource. A resource is rivalerous when one 
person consumes it makes it less available for others. From Homer-Dixon’s examples 
of renewable resources that are rivalerous; fisheries, cropland, forests and water, all 
are being degraded in the Niger Delta. According to the theory of environmental se-
curity, this can be said to be a strong indicator that demand induced scarcity is very 
much a reality in the local communities in the Delta.  
As mentioned, Nigeria is a big country, not only in size but most notably in popu-
lation, which is the highest in Africa. It has a population density which is ranked 84th 
in the world with 124.98 people per square kilometre, approximately the same as 
Denmark 10, in other words high (CIA 2006). The birth rate in Nigeria is 38.24 (per 
1000) and the official government view is that this number is too high (Countryre-
ports.org, Nigeria). The future shows little sign of reversal. Homer-Dixon predicts 
that Nigeria’s population will be doubled in the next 20 – 30 years (1999:55).  
One illustrative example is provided by the Ogoni people who live in the Riv-
ers state number approximately 500 000, but the region of Ogoni but lives on a very 
                                              
9 It is beyond the scope of this paper to get into the ongoing debate on what causes global warming.  
10 As another comparison, Norway has about 14.42 people per square km. 
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small area and the result is a very high population density. An average of 490 people 
per square kilometre is the reality (Ebeh). This is almost four times higher than the 
already high Nigerian average. When large oil spills then turn the Ogoni areas into 
wasteland, the demand induced scarcity becomes even more visible and easier to un-
derstand.  
Demand induced scarcity leads to migration. Also when agriculture in the rural 
areas is not providing the foundation people need for their existence, the incentive to 
move to a city is high. Urbanization is a problem in the delta region, the population in 
major cities is literally exploding. The ensuing scenario – urbanization without the 
economic growth that would ordinarily generate more jobs  - has resulted in the hu-
man ecologist’s ultimate nightmare: a growing population that, in a bid to survive, is 
destroying the very ecosystem that should guarantee its survival (Okonta and Doug-
las 2003:19).   
4.2.1.3 Structural Scarcity  
This form of scarcity happens when some groups gets their access to the resource 
limited, and the portion of the resource they get is too small to sustain their wellbe-
ing. Ike Okonta, describes how the ethnic group the Ogoni is being treated unfair 
compared to the other ethnic groups: Outnumbered and without representation in a 
political regime that centralizes strategic resources (including the Ogoni’s own oil 
wells) by fiat and distributed them accordingly to how many ‘tribesmen’ you were 
able to deploy in the ricious field of power politics, the Ogoni were poor, denied 
meaningful employment, schools, hospitals, electricity and pipe-borne water (Okonta 
2005). It seems like there are forces at work to deliberately keep this specific ethnic 
group away from the resources in the area where they live, at the same time as the 
resources themselves are being eaten away by the oil spills and pollution.  
Interesting to note is that both the numerically weak, the Ogonis and the largest 
ethnic group in the region, the Ijaws both claim unjust treatment. The Ijaw, in addi-
tion to feeling overlooked in the distribution of electoral wards feel they have borne 
the brunt of the damaging effects of oil production and are increasingly militant in 
their demands. In January 2006 the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw communities 
 58 
(FNDIC) kidnapped four expatriate oil workers (Daily Champion 2006). The Ijaw 
National Youth Congress is another militant group whose threat comes in the form of 
invasion of flow stations, lock-outs, vehicle seizures, disruption of oil operations and 
kidnapping. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) kid-
napped nine foreign oil workers in February 2006 and their demand was that Shell 
should pay 1,5 billion dollars to Ijaw fishing communities whose waters have been 
polluted by oil (Shezi 2006). The before mentioned Ken Saro-Wiwa’s organisation 
Movement for the Salvation of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) have followed a more 
peaceful approach, calling for the recognition of the Ogoni as one of the world’s en-
dangered minorities to the United Nations Minorities Council (Soyinka 1996:4).  
The law that is the principal statute governing property in Nigeria is the 1978 
Land Use Act, which states that: All land comprised in the territory of each State in 
the Federation are [sic] hereby vested in the Governor of that State and such land 
shall be held in trust and administered for the use and common benefit of all Nigeri-
ans (Section 1, Decree No. 6 of 1978, Cap. 202, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
referenced in HRW 1999). This legislation is formulated to give all Nigerians the 
right to the land. As we see however, this is only in theory.  
4.2.2 Social Effects 
According to the theory of environmental security there is a connection between en-
vironmental scarcity and various social effects. These social effects in turn constitute 
the grievance that might lead to conflict. In the case of the Niger Delta, both the pres-
ence of a conflict and the widespread scarcity have been identified. However, a de-
scription of the causal step in between is necessary to make this link clear.  
4.2.2.1 Constrained Agricultural productivity  
A lowered production in the agricultural sector is a social effect that can be said to be 
directly linked to the supply-induced scarcity. Obvious logic tells us that farmers 
need healthy land to grow their crops and that fishermen are reliant on a stock of fish 
nearby. When the natural wildlife is also affected, the chances of living of the envi-
ronment decrease even further. It is worrisome also that seemingly no incentive exists 
to turn the process around, so the destroyed cropland and rivers stays barren. The oil 
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companies technique of burning oil spills as a method of cleaning up have resulted in 
massive deprivation of farmlands, forests, rivers and communal property (ERA 
2005:15). In addition, the Niger Delta isolated has one of the highest population den-
sities of the world, and the rapid population growth is increasingly exerting pressure 
on cultivatable land (Okonta and Douglas 2003:19).  
Without making light of this serious issue, the lack of food is a major source of 
frustration. Human Rights Watch outlines a scenario of the devastating individual 
long term impact of spills on people living in the dry land or near fresh water swamps 
areas where the effects are concentrated. Oil leaks are usually from high pressure 
pipelines, and therefore spurt out over a wide area, destroying crops, artificial fish-
ponds used for fish farming, “economic trees” which are valuable trees owned by 
particular families and other income generating assets. Even a small leak can thus 
wipe out a year’s food supply for a family, with it wiping out income from products 
sold for cash. The consequences of such loss range from children missing school be-
cause their parents are unable to pay fees, to virtual destitution (HRW 1999). 
4.2.2.2 Constrained Economic Productivity  
Deriving from the previous point of constrained agricultural productivity, it is not 
hard to see that for the fishermen and farmers in question, their economic output will 
be dramatically reduced. Indigenous peoples living off the forests by hunting and 
gathering are also very much at risk in an environment that is being degraded as their 
very way of life and existence is threatened. Finding an alternative income is some-
times very hard, even for people with higher education. Unemployment rates in the 
Niger Delta are high.  
Poverty is naturally also a major source of frustration and grievance. The fact that 
the annual incomes in the Niger Delta is far below the country average of $280 (Ok-
onta and Douglas 2003:19), should also be evidence of  the constrained economic 
output as well as indicating structural scarcity on a national level.  
4.2.2.3 Migration of the Affected People 
The availability of food and also the economic output can be said to make up a strong 
incentive to relocate in search of better opportunities. When the people affected by 
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pollution and scarcities in the countryside decide to move into the cities, the demands 
on the city infrastructure increases, creating unemployment, poverty and crime.  
The fact that the cities swell with people without employment increases not only 
the risk of crime, but it also in the words of Homer-Dixon, constitutes a particularly 
volatile group that can be easily mobilized for radical political action. In the Niger 
Delta, a lot of the militias are made up from groups of young, frustrated men. Human 
Rights Watch observes that the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and 
the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), two powerful armed groups, are primarily com-
prised of young Ijaw men (HRW 2005a:4). In addition to getting a violent outlet for 
their frustration, these groups provides them with an opportunity to make money 
from bunkering oil from installations and pipes and selling it on the black market.  
4.2.2.4 Greater Segmentation of Society, Usually Along Existing 
(Ethnic) Clevages  
The different groups seem to be using the hardship to form internal unity where they 
as one ethnic group stand together against “the others”, but also against the central 
government and the oil companies. The different organisations/militant groups seem 
to have an element of ethnicity, most notably in their names like the Ijaw Youth 
Council who launched Operation Climate Change and The Kaima Declaration as 
weapons against the pollution in the area, and Ken Saro-Wiwa’s Movement for the 
survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Other more violent groups in the Delta also 
have a strong ethnic base, as the above mentioned NDPVF and NDV.  
The segmentation along existing ethnic lines is not as observable as poverty, hun-
ger and migration, the way that elites tightened grip on resources and its profit is visi-
ble by looking at winners and losers. To feel deprived and seeing others success 
might in turn strengthen the “us” and “them” view of society. If demographic and 
environmental pressure encourages powerful groups within a society to shift redistri-
bution in their favour, there is an opportunity to do so in Nigeria. Looking for exam-
ple at the way that the outnumbered Ogoni people are treated, it is obvious that they 
are losers in the situation.  
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4.2.2.5 Disruption of the State 
This is perhaps the social effect that is most difficult to identify, particularly as a di-
rect effect of the environmental scarcity. In the case of the Niger Delta there seems to 
be several factors disrupting the various institutions, like ethnic conflict and corrup-
tion. When it comes to causing conflict, this is the most important social effect which 
is also affected mostly by the other social effects of environmental scarcity. For ex-
ample, constrained economic productivity erodes confidence in the national purpose 
and weakens the tax base (Homer-Dixon 1999:98). A problem like environmental 
scarcity and the social effects that it produces can reduce the capacity of a state and 
its institutions.  
Another critical issue in this regard is the issue of providing security. In Max 
Weber’s definition of the state, it holds the power to use legitimate violence (Østerud 
et al. 1997:259). In Nigeria and other African countries it is more and more common 
to hire private security or mercenaries of some sort to provide safety, undermining the 
national police and security forces and their capacity to secure the individuals of the 
nation. Also, according to Human Rights Watch several hundred soldiers and sailors 
are permanently deployed in the Delta state. One of their primary duties is to protect 
oil installations, regarded by the Nigerian government as a national security priority 
(HRW 2003:21). In other words, Nigerian military personnel are guarding foreign 
installation from Nigeria’s own citizens. 
4.2.3 Environmental Conflict in the Niger Delta 
The nature of the conflict in the Niger Delta is as mentioned very complex. There are 
several different actors with stakes in the fighting. An attempt to make a description, 
the conflict must be said to be internal in its structure. The companies being targeted 
do not represent a specific nation-state. The tension runs through different levels, 
with the local communities at the group level and the federal government of Nigeria 
at the national level. Like Homer-Dixon predicts, the violence can be said to be sub-
national, persistent and diffuse because it happens within the borders of the country. 
It has been going on for decades, and some of the groupings that rebel are hard to 
identify and they fight for different reasons. We see that at the same time as full on 
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war has been declared on the Nigerian state, some of the ethnic groups are at battle 
with each other.  
What distinguishes the situation in the Niger Delta from the one that Homer-
Dixon describes in the theory of environmental security, is that the grievance and 
frustration is directed most notably against the institution that the inhabitants of the 
region believe causes the degradation, namely the oil companies. The protesting takes 
the shape of vandalism directed against the oil companies and different oil installa-
tions and kidnapping of personnel, mainly western employees. Sabotage serves sev-
eral purposes; it gives the rebels an income in the form of illegal bunkering of oil and 
black market trade. It also affects the production, hurting the companies and at the 
same time raises the price per barrel globally. In January 2006, nine percent of Nige-
ria’s oil output was lost due to the resurgence of crisis in the Niger Delta (Oduniyi 
and Nkanga 2006). On April 12th 2006, the price of oil per barrel was as high as $70 
because of after news of renewed threat by Ijaw militants to attack oil companies and 
production facilities in the Niger Delta sent fresh fears of supply crunch to the inter-
national oil market. Already, the continued loss of more than 550,000 barrels per day 
of oil production by Nigeria, has split the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC), over how to make up for the losses (Oduniyi and Ezigbo 2006). 
The violence that gets the most attention is the before mentioned vandalism by 
the local communities directed against the oil installations and the kidnappings of 
foreign oil workers, but there is also fighting between the different ethnic groups in 
the area. HRW concludes that the violence in Rivers state primarily is the result of a 
struggle between NDPVF and NDV for control over illegal oil revenues (HRW 
2005a:2). Groups in the Delta have long had ownership disputes over geographical 
areas, and there are movements that call for independence from the Nigerian state. 
Threats of secession are not taken lightly, for example, the leader of the Niger Delta 
Volunteer Force Alhaji Mujahid Dokubu-Asari was arrested in October 2005 accused 
of treason after publicly calling for the break up of Nigeria (Olori 2005). Human 
Rights Watch points out that ownership of territory is closely linked to the question 
of representation in the formal structures of government, both at local and state level 
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(2003:3). This is linked with the federal question of Nigeria and will be looked fur-
ther into in the second part of this chapter.  
4.2.3.1 Grievance 
The hardship experienced by the people directly affected by the extraction of oil has 
been thoroughly laid out even though it is hard to fully understand the extent of the 
environmental atrocities for someone not living the nightmare. The aesthetic and 
monetary value of the natural surroundings are effecting peoples way of life in many 
ways, but the degradation is also felt at a very intimate and personal level with the 
low life expectancy and the high instance of premature births. The actual quality of 
life is also seriously compromised with noise, light and air pollution, all coming from 
the oil installations. To make the distinction of relative deprivation, the people in the 
local communities have to perceive their standard of living as being lower compared 
to other groups or with the status quo. Ted Gurr (1985) wrote that people perceive 
their grievance compared to their own status quo or compared to other groups who 
supposedly have it better. One point to make here is that the pollution and degrada-
tion from the oil production does affect all the people in a close proximity the same 
way. Even though the frustration over their joint situation might be the same, the dis-
tribution of the scarce resources as a result of the degradation might constitute a prob-
lem as well off groups and individuals in better positions have better opportunities 
and resources to handle the adverse situation. The difference between people be-
comes more visible and this might also lead to further segmentation of the groups.  
In seeing civil strife as a function of the level of grievance felt and the opportuni-
ties to act on these grievances, it means that the people in the Niger Delta region af-
fected by environmental scarcities in addition to incentives also need the resources to 
act. In these impoverished communities people still have found ways of protesting, 
and this is evidence that the grievance is felt at a high level. As it seems, the envi-
ronmental situation in the region is not getting any better, there is reluctance to clean 
up spills and the oil production is only thought to increase over the next years. In this 
regard it might seem as more and more people are feeling the effects and people in 
the affected areas might experience heightened grievance and further deterioration of 
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their living situation. The future prospects are still bleak for the local inhabitants of 
the Niger Delta, and their grievance is getting little attention from the international 
community beyond the concerns about higher oil prices as result of the violence. In 
this sense, the grievance is only going to increase.  
4.2.3.1 Types of Conflict 
I will not try and label the type of conflict that is found in the Niger Delta, but I will 
try to point out some of the characteristics from the principal types of conflict caused 
by environmental degradation followed from the main theoretical perspectives on 
conflict. The simple scarcity conflict, which describes actors rationally calculating 
their interest in a game situation, can be transferred to the way that the militant 
groups think when they go to war against the oil companies. Calculating their poten-
tial loss they find an incentive to revolt based on the principles of game theory in the 
structural perspective on conflict. Frustration-aggression theories can also be used in 
describing the situation when looking at the way people feel when their livelihood is 
being degraded. Relative deprivation is a fair description of the disposition farmers 
and fishermen potentially feel they are in when finding their source of income gone 
or covered in crude oil.  
To characterize the conflict based on group-identity is also doable when looking 
at the fact that the population of the Niger Delta tend to join their ethnic group when 
protesting. A sense of “us” and “them” can also be strongly detected when for exam-
ple looking at the Warri crisis where the Urhobo and the Itsekiri fought each other 
over the ownership of the resources, and when the Ijaws and the Urhobo made allega-
tions and protested against the distribution of electoral wards being in favour of the 
Itsekiris.  
4.2.4 Adaptation 
Is there ingenuity in the Niger Delta? Given the severity of the scarcities and the en-
vironmental degradation it might look like the ability for the local communities to 
adapt is relatively small. One major exception might be seen in the groups that have 
used the oil pipes that run above ground to make a living by illegal bunkering. Oil is 
taken directly from the company’s pipe and sold on the black market. The theoretical 
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amendment to grievance as the incentive for rebellion, opportunity to act out the frus-
tration can be seen in context with the illegal bunkering as it provides the militant 
groups with economic funds to carry out acts of violence. People have also used the 
flame from the gas flaring in innovative ways, for example to dry cassava.  
Little of the technology coming into the country in the form of petroleum engi-
neers and their knowledge benefits the Nigerian population. The people employed in 
the oil industry are mainly foreign. With high unemployment even among the univer-
sity graduates, this practice can not be said to be in the best interest of Nigeria as no 
value is being added except in the national treasury. This is again leaving the country 
at a disadvantage when it comes to adaptation and technical ingenuity.  
4.2.5 The Vulnerability of the Niger Delta 
In a country or region where there already are major socio-economical problems, it is 
difficult to pinpoint the direct cause of the degradation caused by the extraction of oil. 
Years of mismanagement by military despots has put the country in a poor economic 
state (see for example Wole Soyinka 1996). Corruptive practises are still a major 
problem in today’s civilian governed Nigeria, and are making past mistakes hard to 
correct. The oil money ends up in the hands of the central government and does not 
seem to be spent on project that could potentially generate income from other sectors, 
and prevent the strong monocultural economy. Not spreading the risk with other en-
terprises and with the oil sector not utilizing Nigerian human and material resources 
(see FIOH 2006) makes the economic infrastructure very vulnerable.    
The ecological system of the Delta is highly unique, and the mangrove forest is 
particularly vulnerable to oil spills, because the soil soaks up the oil like a sponge and 
re-releases it every rainy season (HRW 1999). The fact that as many as 44.2 percent 
of the employed persons in the Delta are in the agricultural, fishery and forestry sec-
tors (FIOH 2006:15) shows how many are dependent on the environment to make a 
living. With the additional burden of an increasing population, the natural and human 
conditions in the Delta are vulnerable to the devastating impacts of a deterring envi-
ronment.   
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On another note, the Nigerian government on both federal and local level does 
not seem prepared at all for the devastating consequences. After looking at the envi-
ronmental part of the conflict in the Niger Delta it is time to investigate what effect an 
African democracy have on conflict arising from scarcities. What is the effect of the 
newly democratized Nigerian government on the issue of environmental security in 
the Niger Delta?   
4.3 Democracy in Nigeria and Environmental Conflict 
Jack A. Goldstone outlines how environmental conflict starts and gets increased in 
impact because of circumstances: In countries where regimes are actively involved in 
worsening the risk or toll of such disasters, or by making corrupt or ineffective re-
sponse – political upheavals are likely to follow. Population changes and natural 
disasters, in vulnerable economical and political settings, are thus likely to provide 
the major violent environmental/demographic security issues for the foreseeable fu-
ture (2001:106).  
The Nigerian democracy and civilian rule is new, and the legacy from the past is 
still imminent (see Cyril I. Obi 2004a). The challenges for the new democracy are 
many even without the conflict and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta. 
The country is divided along religious lines, with the most burning issue being the 
Islamic Sharia laws that some of the states have adopted. Politically, the constitu-
tional debates continue. Recently there have been talks about extending the presidents 
rule to three terms, and this would mean that Obasanjo could run in another election. 
BBC news (2005) reports that both northern and southern leaders have held meetings 
and demanded that the next president should come from their respective areas. An-
other hot issue in Nigeria is the question of how many Nigerians are there. A census 
is being held in March of 2006 but this encompasses a great deal of controversy, 
which relates to religious and ethnic divides. The different groups are feuding over 
who is the majority and every other attempt to hold a census in Nigeria has resulted 
in allegations of misrepresentation and manipulation of numbers (see Sole Odunfa 
2005 and Omari H. Kokole 1994).  
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The behaviour of the Nigerian elites and the widespread corruption are important 
points. State exploitation hypothesis will be used to look into these aspects of the Ni-
gerian state. It becomes obvious that the traits of African democracy as outlined by 
Bøås and Dokken (2002) are present in this society. Chabal and Daloz describes the 
countries south of the Sahara as clientelistic regimes that have more or less reluc-
tantly adopted the procedures of multiparty elections and whatever the effects of mul-
tiparty elections, they have emphatically not lead to political behaviour that resem-
bles substantively those to be found in Europe, North America, or even South East 
Asia (2006:28). The political behaviour seen in Nigeria happens along vertical lines 
and is to a large degree based on personal relationships.  
Clientelistic networks or systems of ‘co-ethnic friendship’ prevent the advent of 
any functioning formal bureaucratic organisation. The more resources bureaucrats 
control the more they operate though they were in charge of ‘business’. All civil ser-
vants, even the lowliest, find ways of negotiating the powers bestowed upon them by 
their office (Chabal and Daloz 2006:267). This is in fact a description of the Nigerian 
bureaucracy and institutions of management. Ingenuity, or the ability to adapt pre-
sents a possibility of overcoming the obstacles of environmental scarcity, but also 
state management. The ability to face such challenges is therefore an important point 
and a test of the capability of the Nigerian democracy.  
4.3.0 State Capacity  
Homer-Dixon identifies four links between rising environmental scarcity and declin-
ing state capacity. First, environmental scarcities increase financial and political de-
mands on the state. Second, resource scarcities affect the state via their effect on the 
elites. Third, predatory behaviour by elites often evokes defensive reactions by 
weaker groups that directly depend on the resource in question. Fourth, if resource 
scarcity affects the economy’s general productivity, tax revenues to local and national 
governments can decline (1999:101-103), all of which in turn increases the possibil-
ity of conflict. The ability to withstand these trends and maintain state capacity is 
then an important factor in a volatile society as well as being crucial in building a 
democracy.    
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The capacity of the Nigerian state needs to be seen in the light of being a third 
world country with a complex and violent history and with a long and difficult road 
to the current democratic regime. Also, in the words of Ted Gurr, the absence of a 
strong bureaucratic-authoritarian state with less capacity and less resources to manage 
crisis, is what makes the states less likely to implement appropriate policies 
(1985:71). To analyse the notion of state capacity in the Niger Delta, I draw on the 
conceptual tools made by the Toronto group, presented as a table in the theory chap-
ter. State capacity will encompass both the intrinsic characteristics of the state itself 
and the relationship between the state and society.  
4.3.1.1 Characteristics of the State  
From what is labelled characteristics of the state in the conceptual framework, I will 
first look at the human capital. The technical and managerial skill level of individuals 
within the state and its component parts is in a way hard to measure, but if we look at 
some characteristics already laid out on African democracy and the state of Nigeria, 
we can see that human capital is lacking.  Firstly, the basic will of managing the gov-
ernment resources in the best interest of the public is not there. Secondly, the neo-
patrimonial system that allows for the personal based relationships, can not be said to 
be in favour of increased technical and managerial skills because of its person-based 
characteristics. This is a kind of system that works for the people at the top and is 
constructed in such a way to ensure that they there.  
Another concept is instrumental rationality. This means the ability of the different 
elements of the state to gather information and use it in a utility maximizing way. The 
question here is then what is the real interest of the state, and I will come back to this 
line of questioning in the state exploitation hypothesis section. From the actions of 
the civilian government however, it looks as if it is very much aware of the conflict 
and have taken steps to get some of the feuding parts to sit down and talk. One could 
say though, that this is just putting out the fire and not fixing the underlying cause of 
conflict.  
When it comes to coherence, the third concept of state capacity, the first thing to 
remember is that Nigeria and the Niger Delta region are extremely heterogeneous in 
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their compositions. As mentioned, within this populous nation there are a myriad of 
different religious believes, languages and ethnicities. This is taken into consideration 
when it comes to the constitutional design of the nation, most importantly in the fed-
eral construction as I will point out a little later. Looking at Nigeria as a whole, it is 
easily noticeable that it is not only in the Niger Delta that conflict is brewing. The 
Islamic Sharia law in some of the northern states and other feuds between Muslims 
and Christians are major issues in the country. One recent issue concerning is the 
census that is taking place in the spring of 2006. Both religious groups compete of 
being the majority to have that as leverage in political issues.    
Another indicator of state capacity used by the Toronto-group is resilience, or the 
ability to withstand sudden shocks and changes, is what a state need to protect itself 
from unforeseen problems. As a monocultural economy with 95 percent of the coun-
try’s exports and 80 percent of federal government revenue coming from the oil ex-
traction (Obi 2004a:13-14). Nigeria is in a sense putting all their eggs in one basket 
even though at the present time it is a guaranteed income and the demand for oil 
around the globe is high. The fact that attacking oil installations in the Niger Delta 
has had a substantial effect on the global oil prices must be a known fact to the rebels. 
Higher price per barrel will increase the income of the central Nigerian state. There-
fore, one of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta’s (MEND) goals 
is to lower the production of oil in the country and this way hurt both the state and the 
oil companies. Their method of approach is vandalism in various forms.  
4.3.1.2 The Relationship between State and Society 
The first characteristic of state capacity in the relationship between state and society 
is autonomy, and indicates to which extent the state can act independently of external 
forces. Obi (2004b) describes the Nigerian petro-state, and points to the fact that 
since the early 1970’s the country has been entirely dependent on earnings from the 
production and exports of crude oil. The state depends on oil as a source of national 
revenue, at the same time the Nigerian state has the sole ownership of all the oil pro-
duction in the country. According to the Petroleum Act, a licence obtained from the 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources is required before any oil operation is commended 
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(HRW 1999). This means in a way that the government has institutionalized the re-
source and is seemingly in control. But seen from another perspective, through these 
laws the central government has only found a way of institutionalizing their depend-
ency on the income from the oil production. The implications of this practice affect 
the capacity of the state by lowering the autonomy. Since these oil companies occupy 
a central place in Nigeria’s political economy, they have leverage over the state. 
Hence it is difficult for the state institutions to effectively regulate them. For exam-
ple, the oil companies show little sign of stopping the practice of gas flaring even 
though it is now illegal to dispose of gas in this manner. Again, this affects the local 
population of the Niger Delta.  
The state’s fiscal resources is another indicator of state capacity. The more 
money it is in position of, the more capable it is to implement its policies on to soci-
ety. The central Nigerian government gets most of its resources from the oil produc-
tion, the highest estimate say 98 percent (Countrystudies.org, Nigeria). Oil is a lucra-
tive commodity, but the country is still very poor. The spending of the central gov-
ernment is one of the issues that are being put into questioning by those who feel like 
the revenues are not reaching the places they are needed. Given that such a large por-
tion of the population lives in poverty, and especially in the Niger Delta, this is not 
hard to understand. This can also be seen in the light of the next indicator of state ca-
pacity, the reach and responsiveness of the state in society. It is the degree to which 
the state is successful in extending its ideology, socio-political structures and admin-
istrative apparatus throughout society. The Nigerian federal system is meant to be a 
way of administrating the large and multi-faceted nation by having authorities closer 
to the different regions. If the federal system was working as it was intended, the 
reach of the central government would go far, but instead, Nigeria is very centralized 
in its structure. Chabal and Daloz writes in their observation of Nigeria that little dis-
tinction between the public and private spheres exists and, however authoritarian the 
state may appear to be on the surface, it is unable to assert either  effective control of 
government or, even less, hegemony on society (2006:220-221). The state is in this 
sense poor and unable to reach the society.  
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The next indicator of state capacity is legitimacy. When it comes to the democ-
ratic principles of the state, this is a very important point since a legitimate state has 
moral authority and because of this is recognised by the public. It also provides rec-
ognition from other states. The one thing that Human Rights Watch point to when it 
comes to the authorities’ handling of the rebellion in the Delta, is the impunity. The 
military youth that have been terrorizing local communities are getting away with it. 
The perpetrators that are caught are not being prosecuted and are also able to pay 
their way out of the hands of the law enforcement. In the conflict areas around Port 
Harcourt, the state government offered U.S. $1800 for the return of each assault rifle 
and amnesty from persecution to encourage disarmament (2005a:20). Although the 
government initiative was a step to end the violence, impunity can not be said to 
strengthen the rule of law. In an attempt to build peace, an important human right is 
overlooked, the rights of the victims of their atrocities. This impunity can be said to 
weaken the legitimacy of the Nigerian government. It’s hard to speculate as to why 
the Nigerian government is choosing this method of approach. However, Human 
Rights Watch found strong evidence to suggest that senior members of the state gov-
ernment at one time gave financial or logistic support to the leaders of both NDPVF 
and NDV (2005a:3). There could be a fear that prosecuting the violent groups would 
incriminate government officials at the same time.  
The capacity of the Nigerian state is affected by several factors. The very fact that 
the population is increasing and the extent of the environmental degradation are, in 
the view of Homer-Dixon reason for the decreased capacity. Also, the different unre-
solved conflicts both in the Niger Delta and other religious/ethnic clashes do not 
show any great state capacity. Looking at all the components of state capacity, it be-
comes clear that the characteristics of the political sphere and the constitutional de-
sign are the main dilemmas. Federalism as a conflict management system has failed 
and all parts of the federation are complaining of the lopsidedness in the distribution 
of the national wealth (Agbu 2004:40-41) and the country’s elites are rewarded 
within the patrimonial framework erected upon the distribution of petro-dollars (Obi 
2004b). 
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4.3.2 Public Policy/Redistribution  
Quentin Gausset and Michael A. Whyte note that studies of the African environment 
is seldom neutral. Always in the argumentations there will be implicit and explicit 
claims about who best understands African environments and who should have the 
right to control them (2005:22). Given the colonial history of the continent, it is an 
obvious point to make. Like Hauge and Ellingsen say in their outline of the shortage 
of Homer-Dixon’s theory, land distribution, as well as the degradation of land, forest 
and water, is linked not only to demographic patterns, but also to economic and po-
litical factors (1998:303). Environmental management must take more completely 
into account the complexity of local histories and of cultural, political and socio-
economic context (Gausset and Whyte 2005:22)  
I have already established that there are structural scarcities in the Niger Delta, so 
we can see that the democratic function of redistribution is not functioning optimally. 
Better distribution is also one of the major outcries of the rebels in the Niger Delta. 
The strongest indicator of the skewed distribution can be seen in the nation’s eco-
nomic base. Clearly something is wrong with the redistribution of a nations wealth if 
70 percent of the population live under the poverty line and the country has earned 
about $ 340 billion in the last 40 years (Obi 2004b:6). The constitutional function that 
is held responsible in the outcries for better redistribution is the one that only grants 
the state where the natural wealth was extracted 13 percent of the profits.  
Nigerian law provides that all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas are the prop-
erty of the federal government11. The Petroleum Act also provides in section 1 that 
the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon lands to which 
this section applies shall be vested in the state. The Petroleum Act also requires a 
licence to be obtained from the Ministry of Petroleum before any oil operation is 
commenced (HRW 1999). In this way, the constitution of Nigeria favours the state 
and its clients, which Obi points out when he writes that the centralistic and monopo-
listic power of the state is reflected in at the point of distributive politics, particularly 
                                              
11 Article 40(3) of the 1979 constitution; Article 42(3) of the 1989 constitution; Article 47(3) draft 1995 constitution, 
referenced in HRW (1999).  
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as it defines those who control (and benefits) and others who lose out in the struggle 
of contesting claims (2004a:14).  
4.3.2.1 Federalism  
The question of redistribution in Nigeria is very much linked to the question of feder-
alism. The call for better distribution is part of many of the feuding groups’ claims. 
The frustration of getting a smaller piece of the pie than others have been put as the 
cause for taking up arms by the Ijaw Youth Council and other groups. On the account 
that virtually all of the federal income is from the oil production, it is not hard to 
imagine that the central government would fear a secessionist movement in the Niger 
Delta. The laws and regulations have been organized in a way that allows the admini-
stration in Abuja to take more than the lion’s share of the money derived from the 
resources.  
William Reno describes Nigeria, and calls federalism of this sort the institutional 
framework of a centralized national patronage system (1999:108). The way that fed-
eral structure was designed to ensure different groups autonomy, control over local 
resources and equal access to power at the federal level to all groups is thus not in 
effect. The reasoning behind constructing Nigeria as a federal state is on the basis of 
its diversity. The idea was that federalism was the best way of managing the mixture 
of beliefs, ethnicities and languages. Ever since independence there has been contro-
versy around the organizing and the geographical borders of the states much on the 
basis of the distribution of state revenue. There is a strong historical factor in the divi-
sion and administration of the territory. The Niger Delta was part of the Biafra seces-
sionist territory. It was already clear then that the federal Nigerian government des-
perately wanted to keep Nigeria unified to remain in control of the oil resources lay-
ing under these wetlands (Okonta and Douglas 2003:21).  
Cyril I.Obi and Osita Agbu ties the question of Nigerian federalism to the Na-
tional Question, on how the constitutional design should be in an ethnic diverse state, 
but also to the question of redistribution. What the central government is granting in 
revenues to the states is a highly politicized issue. Agbu writes that all parts of the 
federation are complaining of the lopsideness in the distribution of the national 
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wealth (2004:40). Ray Ekpu writes that the fundamental problem of Nigeria’s feder-
alism still remains the over-centralization of powers and resources in the national 
government, and the destructive and divisive struggles for the control of the centre 
that this centralization invariably engenders (1994:6).  William Reno (1999) de-
scribes Nigeria as a de facto centralized state and attributes this to the oil wealth. 
Power seems to be where the money is, and the federal system we see in Nigeria is 
then a sort of institutional framework of a centralized national patronage system.  
4.3.3 State Explointation Hypothesis  
Colin H. Kahl’s (1998) hypothesis proposes that disintegration and manipulation play 
a part in violence arising from renewable resource scarcity. The elites are given the 
incentives to exploit by the rewards in the form of resources, and the opportunities to 
do so because of the system of economic marginalization. To examine if this hy-
pothesis holds any truth in the Niger Delta case, one needs to look at the nature of the 
society and the state. As we have seen, the very composition of the Nigerian society 
suggests predatory behaviour of the elites. 70 percent of the population live under the 
poverty line, and people in the Niger Delta are poorer than the national average.  
When the elites are exploiting an adverse situation to profit for themselves, they 
can be said to be using the state and the neo-patrimonial system to feather one’s own 
nest. As we have seen, the legislature of the federation has in a way cemented the 
winners and the losers. Such patron-client relationships are a dominant feature in the 
Nigerian society. One way it is visible, is in the big spending of the patrons. Political 
representation rests on the dramatisation of power, at the heart of which lies ostenta-
tion or ‘showing off’ (Chabal and Daloz 2006:289). Oddly enough from a western 
view, in the clients eyes this ostentation and display of wealth by the patrons evokes a 
sense of pride as they feel like they contributed to the patrons riches (ibid:291). In the 
U.N.’s Human Development report (2005), Nigeria ranks 158 out of 177 countries in 
an inequality in income or consumption indicator12, showing that the gap between 
rich and poor in Nigeria is extremely wide.   
                                              
12 Using Gini index to measure inequality within a country.  
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4.3.3.1 Elites 
It is impossible to discuss the democratic project in Nigeria without discussing the 
role of the Nigerian political elite (Obi 2004b:7). In his article, Kahl (1998) talks 
about incentives and opportunities for state exploitation. In Nigeria we see that the 
opportunity for the federal government to exploit is in the constitutional framework 
as the wealth of the oil production ends up in the hands of the nation’s petro-elite. 
The incentive is fairly obvious. The control of central governmental positions renders 
you control of national oil wealth. When it comes to opportunity, Gurr writes that 
economically advantaged groups are better able to use market forces and political 
influence to maintain their positions (1985:58). Having money and a powerful posi-
tion makes it easier to maintain this position, and with the networks in place the 
members of the elite are ensured a steady income.   
Obi writes that the Nigerian political elite is a product of Nigeria’s tumultuous 
politics. It has roots in the colonial education and socio-politics, and as such it is a 
child of history (2004b:7). Chabal and Daloz observes that most Nigerians today are, 
as they always were, obsessed with securing protection from a patron – not from the 
state (2006:262).  As we can see from this, the neo-patrimonial ways of thinking are 
deeply rooted in the Nigerian society and very much a part of the way people deal 
with each other on a day to day basis.  
Institutional inclusivity is one of Kahl’s intervening variables, and the fact that 
the states of the Nigerian federation are not included in the national wealth shows the 
institutional exclusion. The situation in the Niger Delta also proves his major point 
that states need not totally collapse for population growth and environmental pressure 
to produce violent internal conflict. Patrimonialism is seen in the way the control of 
resources is a measure of the ability to exercise power. The elite, for their part, ex-
ploit such personal and informal relations (Chabal and Daloz 2006:262).  
4.3.3.2 Corruption 
Okonta and Douglas (2003) describe oil as the stuff of contemporary Nigerian poli-
tics. In Transparency International’s 2004 annual report, Nigeria ranks as number 144 
of the 146 countries in the Corruption Perception Index, with only Bangladesh and 
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Haiti being more corrupt. In Global Integrity’s 2004 report, Nigeria gets a “weak” 
rating in their public integrity index which tracks corruption, openness and account-
ability, and they conclude that in Nigeria, corruption is a way of life, especially in 
government and business. One alarming thing, even though corruption seems to be on 
the agenda and scandals are given a lot of coverage in Nigerian media, little has re-
sulted from the allegations and very few have actually been prosecuted.  
Neo-patrimonial practices of Nigerian politics in a lot of instances take the form 
of cash handover. The money the clients have to pay the patrons in the formal system 
in order to get services can be labelled as corruption. Transparency International de-
fines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. This means that 
democratic institutions are weakened Political costs manifests themselves above all 
in loss of legitimacy, and of public trust and support (TI 2004:2). They also say that 
decisions are taken not for the public benefit but to serve private interest, which in a 
way is consistent with neo-patrimonial practises where the public and private spheres 
exist without any real division.    
Obi writes that vast sums of petro-dollars are used to privatize state power, to buy 
off the opposition and to arm and deploy the instruments of state coercion (2004a:5). 
Human Rights Watch find strong evidence that government officials have given the 
feuding groups in the Niger Delta money and weapons as a way of spreading fear and 
ensuring their own victory at the polls in the first free election (HRW 2005a). This 
really shows the extent of corruption. Bribery, pay offs and even imploring to vio-
lence came from top level officials even at the dawn of democracy.  
Another example, the relationship between the Nigerian government and the oil 
companies inflicting the environmental degradation might easily fall under the head-
ing of corruption. The way the Nigerian legislature is formulated in the Petroleum 
Act, international oil companies need a licence to operate in the country. It is more 
than likely that this licence practice provides officials with a lucrative income gener-
ating project (See ERA 2005).  According to the U.S. Department of Energy, Nige-
ria’s state- owned oil company reported losses of $4 billion to crime and corruption 
in 2000 alone (Klare 2004:124) 
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4.3.4 Nigerian Democracy  
Freedom house (2005) labels Nigeria as being “partly free” in its index of govern-
ments. The country must also be said to be relatively new to the concept of democ-
racy being granted civilian rule as late as in 1999 after years of different military 
leaders. However, in the Map of Freedom they describe Nigeria as transitioning in a 
negative direction because of decreased freedom of the press and also the increased 
violence in the Niger Delta. It looks like some of the early optimism for the country 
after its first election of a civilian president has diminished. Obi points to the centrali-
zation of power and the patrimonial networks (2004a:14) when he describes how the 
struggle for power in Nigeria is really a struggle for money since the control over the 
oil revenues lies with government control. On the background of the description in 
the theory chapter these neo-patrimonial networks are characteristics of a democracy 
in Africa and it can also describe the way the Nigerian state is organized.   
Agbu writes that though democracy embodies the recognition and respect of in-
dividual, this should not be allowed as an excuse by those who decide to exploit this 
for individual and group advantages through violent means. Fundamental to finding a 
sustainable solution to the problem of managing the diversity, is a re-visit to the fed-
eral practice (2004:40). The point that Midlarsky (1998) makes, that a democracy 
cannot sustain long under conditions of extreme inequality, seems to ring true for the 
case of the Niger Delta where the gap between the poor and the rich is among the 
widest in the world. 
4.3.4.1 Elections  
The civilian take-over happened in Nigeria in 1999 and the one crucial step to estab-
lish the new democracy was to hold free elections. Obasanjo's People's Democratic 
Party (PDP) won the majority of seats in both the Senate and House of Representa-
tives. The results of the first election were approved, but there were a lot of objec-
tions made. Leading European Union election observers concluded in the Rivers 
State in the Delta that “the minimum standards for democratic elections were not 
met” (HRW 2005a:5). Also, one cannot say that the elections happened peacefully. 
The transition to democracy in 1999 exacerbated youth militancy as unscrupulous 
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politicians hired “thugs” to carry out violence to ensure their victory at the polls 
(ibid:4). Human Rights Watch have unveiled that militant youth were hired by politi-
cians to terrorise the supporters of the opposition (2005b).  
Nigeria made its first peaceful transition from one democratically elected gov-
ernment to another in April 2003, when Obasanjo was re-elected for a second term. 
Even in this election over 100 people were killed (2005a:4). Freedom House (2005) 
reports that local and international observers witnessed serious irregularities in the 
2003 elections. Some of the irregular behaviour included ballot-box stuffing, multiple 
voting, falsification of results, and voter intimidation. Interesting is it that the observ-
ers maintained that fraud and intimidation were particularly prevalent in the southeast 
of the country and in the Niger Delta. 
4.3.5 Nigerian Adaptation  
Put simplistically, adapting to adverse situations and deprivation is the alternative to 
taking up arms and protesting. Homer-Dixon calls ingenuity ideas applied to solve 
practical social and technical problems (1995:590). Faced with scarcity and economic 
marginalization, I will argue that social adaptation to resource scarcity in the Niger 
Delta can be seen in the widespread practice of illegal bunkering of crude oil among 
the local population. In fact, Human Rights Watch states that a part of the conflict can 
be contributed to the illegal oil trading since different armed groups are fighting over 
the control of territory and bunkering routes (2005a:8). For the people living in the 
Niger Delta, bunkering and selling oil on the black market is a way of generating 
profit in the wake of other means of livelihood disappearing because of the oil extrac-
tion. Even though illegal and in many cases a way of sponsoring the violence, it is a 
sign of creativity. In an interview with the leader of NDPVF, he stated “I don’t en-
gage in bunkering, I take that which belongs to me. It is not theft the oil belongs to 
our people” (ibid).  
Another way of looking at adaptation is that the regime in place has to respond to 
changing demands from the population. The state apparatus has to show ingenuity in 
order to serve its function. Looking at the new Nigerian democracy’s ability to re-
spond, one example is that the government has not succeeded in providing jobs. It is 
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safe to say that there are many challenges for Nigerian officials. The adaptation to 
crisis like low development and environmental degradation are major issues to deal 
with. As a response to the local demands for greater resource ownership and devel-
opment in the Delta, president Obasanjo established the Niger Delta Development 
Commission soon after he took office. This is supposed to use oil money to improve 
the region’s infrastructure, such as schools and health clinics and to create jobs (BBC 
news 2006). The government has also established a Ministry of Environment. How-
ever, the Environmental Resources Managers Ltd’s survey of the regulatory frame-
work governing protection of the environment in Nigeria conclude that most state 
and local government institutions involved in environmental resource management 
lack funding, trained staff, technical expertise, adequate information, analytical ca-
pability and other pre-requisites for implementing comprehensive policies and pro-
gramme (1997:234).  
4.4 Summary of Arguments  
The case of the conflict and environmental degradation in the Niger Delta in the con-
text of a new Nigerian democracy has now been analysed based on the model derived 
on the background of the work of the Toronto group, their critics and scholars on de-
mocracy in Africa. A summary of arguments is in order. Based on characteristics in 
the theoretical outline of environmental security and the case of the Niger Delta, it 
can be no question that there is no safe and generally satisfactory environment fa-
vourable to development. Renewable resources are disappearing and habitats are de-
stroyed. Signs of the three different types of scarcities and the following social effects 
have been made discernible in the Delta case. The case is to a large degree displaying 
the relevance of Homer-Dixon and colleagues’ arguments. There is a presence of 
grievance and the people in the region live out a big paradox being poorer than aver-
age in the area accumulating almost all the riches. There is a complex conflict in the 
Niger Delta and parts of it have characteristics from the different types of environ-
mental conflict.  
The arrow of causality pointing from a democratic regime to the relationship be-
tween grievance caused by environmental degradation and violence in my model has 
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helped to show the winners and the losers in the case by adding the political and eco-
nomical factors and looking at the circumstances. Nigeria fits the descriptions of an 
“African democracy” with all of what that implies. The nation has low state capacity 
making it ill equipped to handle severe environmental degradation, and this can be 
seen in the lack of appropriate policies. The characteristics of the state, most notably 
in the federal practices, and the relationship between the state and society with exten-




5.1 The Aim of the Thesis 
The question I wished to answer was:  
What effect does an African democracy have on conflict arising from environ-
mental degradation? More specifically, I want to investigate if the existence of a de-
mocratic regime in Nigeria has any positive effect on the conflict in the Niger Delta 
arising from the scarcities of resources in the region.  
On the basis of this question I developed a model of causal paths based on theory 
of environmental security and democracy in an African context, this model was used 
in the analysis.  
5.2 Main Findings on Conflict Arising from Grievance over 
Scarcities 
The case I have looked at and analysed does have a lot of the characteristics of an 
environmental conflict. The Niger Delta being one of the most disrupted habitats on 
our planet and that makes it highly susceptive to environmental conflict. The frustra-
tion expressed from the inhabitants also point to this. More than 10 years after the 
execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, his struggle for the environment and minority rights is 
continuing. The Niger Delta case is quite special when it comes to looking at it in the 
light of environmental security. First of all there is in fact a serious conflict going on. 
Secondly, the framework laid out by the Toronto group fits the case very well. But 
still it is problematic to attribute the cause of the conflict to the environmental condi-
tions alone since there are so many other factors and frustrations in the mix. The first 
conclusion will therefore have to be that environmental security can only explain the 
part of the conflict that originates from frustration and grievance felt because of loss 
of habitat, food, water and means of income. I conclude that elements of supply in-
duced, demand induced, and structural scarcity are present in the Niger Delta situa-
tion and these concepts can be used to explain grievance felt by the people affected.  
The rebel groups get their funding from the illegal bunkering of oil. This eco-
nomic opportunity however, is not open for most of the inhabitants in the area, which 
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live in absolute poverty. The masses do not have the opportunities to rebel even 
though they experience a high level of grievance. The elites of Nigeria and their prac-
tices show that states need not totally collapse in order for population pressures and 
environmental degradation to lead to conflict. There are opportunities and incentives 
for the elites to exploit the grievances as they are in a better position to manipulate 
the market forces to their own advantage. As we have seen, it becomes clear who the 
winners and losers are in the case. Those who do not possess the means to manipulate 
their situation stay destitute. And more importantly they don’t seem to have the op-
portunity to act on their grievance.  
5.2.1 Theoretical Implications 
As we have seen, the framework of Homer-Dixon and the Toronto group works very 
well to describe the complex situation of degradation, scarcities and their social ef-
fects in the Niger Delta, but through my investigation and application of the theory of 
environmental security I have showed the need for a wider understanding of the con-
cept. Therefore, I have in my effort to look at the causes of this conflict investigated 
the environmental degradation on a theoretical framework, and added the effects of a 
regime type as a separate variable with an independent effect to the analysis. 
It is difficult to determine the exact cause of conflict. In most cases there is more 
than one reason behind violence, and this is very much the reality of the Niger Delta 
case. The region seems to have all the odds against it as far as peace go. Like Cyril I. 
Obi says, it is often in the intersection of wealth and poverty, and extraction, dispos-
session and pollution, where violent conflict emerges (2004a:4). This conflict has 
violence on many levels and feuds between several different actors.  
5.3 Main Findings on the Effects of a New Democratic 
Regime 
The newly democratised regime of Nigeria’s effect on the relationship on conflict in 
the Niger Delta arising from environmental scarcity lies in the nature of this democ-
racy and its capacity. In the case of Nigeria we have seen that state capacity is very 
low, with a centralized federal structure ill equipped for distribution and neo-
patrimonial practices making democratic processes as seen in western countries diffi-
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cult. Without any real democracy, apart from when the formal institutions of state 
power are controlled by the ‘petro-elite’, governance in a constructive or develop-
mental sense cannot be on the social agenda – rather, what exists is misgovernance, 
the wilful manipulation of state institutions and oil resources and oil resources, to 
satisfy the economic interests of a transterritorialised hegemonic class that is central 
to the global accumulation of oil (Obi 2004a:15).  
Considering the new democracy in Nigeria, giving people the right to vote and 
taking the military rulers out of play does not necessarily provide the population with 
better protection of the environment. Even when facing economic prosperity simulta-
neously as severe environmental degradation and a booming population, the democ-
ratic institutions does not seem to be equipped to handle the serious situation.  I con-
clude that without any real function of the state institutions and redistribution of pub-
lic funding, just having democratic principles in the constitution can not be said to 
have any positive effect on the conflict arising from scarcities. 
I have seen no real sign of the central government of Nigeria adapting to the chal-
lenges it is faced with or that the new democracy is operating in the best interest of 
the environment. The patterns of public policy that Ted Gurr outlines don’t seem to 
be in place in Nigeria or the Niger Delta. The Nigerian state runs a lucrative business 
operation in the extraction of oil, a production that has made a country like Norway 
prosperous. Still the country is the biggest debtor in Africa (The Economist 2006), 70 
percent of the population live in poverty, and every part of the administration is 
haunted by corruption. The economic potential is far from fulfilled. Little value is 
being added into the Nigerian infrastructure with the revenues derived from the oil 
export, and the people of the Niger Delta stay poor and without opportunities and 
also the state capacity is not likely to increase. I conclude that it is the elites, not the 
local inhabitants of the Niger Delta, which have the opportunities in Nigeria, and they 
are using them to stay in power – not to better the environmental situation.  
5.3.1 Theoretical Implications 
Theoretical concepts used to explain the African democratic experience seems to 
have a large degree of substance when it comes to the new Nigerian democracy. By 
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including them as contextual factors, the perspective widens, and a larger part of the 
conflict can be explained. My model catches a lot of the other causes tied to the con-
cept of a democratic regime. We have seen that the different indicators of state capac-
ity, the distributional powers of the so-called federal system, the neo-patrimonial sys-
tem with economic mismanagement by elites and extensive corrupt practises can not 
be said to have any positive effect on conflict caused by environmental and demo-
graphic pressures.   
For the case of the Niger Delta, I find my model of causal links to be more ex-
haustive than the classic theory of environmental security as it encompasses more 
factors relevant for the given case. After the advent of democracy in Nigeria steps 
have been taken in the right direction, but there are few signs that the Nigerian gov-
ernment are handling the problems they are facing in a satisfying way. One could 
even say that their own system of neo-patrimonialism is working against positive 
change in the Delta region and the rest of Nigeria because of low state capacity, 
predatory elites and the extensive corruption. In this case we see that it is the elite and 
the militants making themselves wealthy by illegal bunkering that have the opportu-
nity to manipulate and to revolt. 
As for the possibility for the model’s use in other cases, it does bring in some of 
the factors that the critics of traditional theory of environmental security point to, like 
regime type and political and economic indicators. I do think it can be used on other 
cases to generate knowledge and shed light on some links based on the framework 
theoretical concepts that I have taken from other researchers and used in this analysis 
even though the Niger Delta is a unique case in many aspects.  
I also see a possibility for further use of the concepts to look closer at the situa-
tion in the Niger Delta. It could be very interesting to se if the State Exploitation The-
sis could be used to say something fruitful about whether or not the authorities in Ni-
geria actually see the conflict as a positive situation for themselves, as some scholars 
claim. We have seen in my thesis, there is seemingly little adaptation and willingness 
to put an end to the situation. With the oil prices being high and the transparency get-
ting overshadowed, the conflict could potentially be profitable for the government 
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